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Mass Arbitration 2.0
Andrew B. Nissensohn*
Abstract
Over the past four decades, corporate interests, in concert
with the Supreme Court, have surgically dismantled the
American civil litigation system. Enacted nearly a century ago,
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was once a procedural law
mandating that federal courts enforce arbitration agreements
between sophisticated parties with equal bargaining power.
Through death by a thousand cuts, corporate interests shielded
themselves from nearly all methods of en masse dispute
resolution. These interests weaponized the FAA into a “one size
fits all” means to compel potential litigants with unequal
bargaining power into arbitration. The so-called “Arbitration
Revolution” is the subject of much scholarly literature, but a
nascent offspring of the Revolution is forcing corporate interests
to retreat from their decades-long crusade—Mass Arbitration.
In recent years, aggrieved plaintiffs, shackled by mandatory
bilateral arbitration agreements, took matters into their own
hands. Armed with highly-capitalized law firms and frequently
untapped arbitration provisions, plaintiffs acquiesced to
corporate demands and filed their disputes in arbitration. But
this time they did it differently than others before
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of Law; B.S., 2020, University of Florida. Thank you, Professor Alan Trammell,
for serving as my Note advisor and providing your unparalleled expertise and
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them: compiling thousands of nearly identical claims and filing
demands for individual arbitration en masse.
Part I of this Note documents the Arbitration Revolution,
whereby defense-side interests strategically dismantled the civil
litigation system. Part II then proceeds to the emergence of Mass
Arbitration and the initial responses of corporate interests.
Importantly, this is a snapshot in time—it is inevitable that the
defense bar will adapt to this dramatic change in the litigation
sphere. But the question of how they will do so remains
unanswered. Part III looks to Mass Arbitration 2.0 and details
analyzes two potential paths under current Supreme Court
precedent. Businesses might throw in the towel and return to the
conventional civil litigation system, as Amazon recently did.
Alternatively, they might “tighten the screws” and eliminate
“saving grace” consumer-friendly terms that arguably kept their
arbitration agreements afloat when challenged. Given the
uncertainty of this response, Part IV proposes concrete actions
needed to reverse the decades-long misguided interpretation of
the FAA and safeguard the rights and interests of consumers and
employees throughout America.
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Representative government and trial by jury are the
heart and lungs of liberty. Without them we have no
other fortification against being ridden like horses,
fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle and fed and
clothed like swines and hounds.
John Adams1
INTRODUCTION
“In a contest between just me—a restaurant in
Oakland—and American Express, who do you think wins?”2 In
1993, Alan Carlson and his wife opened a small Italian
1. Thomas J. Methvin, Alabama—The Arbitration State, 62 ALA. LAW.
48, 49 (2001).
2. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice¸ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015),
https://perma.cc/TVH4-TAHF.
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restaurant in Oakland, California.3 Operating on razor-thin
profit margins, the restaurant survived by fostering a sense of
community, serving high quality food, and providing great
service.4 Ten years later, Carlson took on a corporate giant and
sued on behalf of small business owners who were unable to turn
away diners who used American Express cards even though the
processing fees were 30 percent higher than competitors’.5 In
2011, the Supreme Court would ultimately decide that his class
action suit could not continue because of a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement nestled in the Acceptance Agreement he
had signed decades earlier.6 The Court disregarded clear
evidence that each claim required nearly one million dollars in
expert fees while each plaintiff’s maximum recovery was only
$38,000.7
“It’s the worst decision I ever made.”8 At 28, Matt Kilgore
sought to fulfill his lifelong dream of becoming a helicopter pilot
and enrolled at a for-profit flight school that a federal judge
would later describe as an “airborne Ponzi scheme.”9 Following
the advice of school representatives, Kilgore took out a loan from
Keybank to pay the $55,950 tuition bill.10 Much to his surprise,
the flight school went bankrupt halfway through his training
and he was left with no diploma and thousands of dollars of
student loan debt.11 Kilgore sued Keybank on behalf of himself
and other students, alleging that the bank knew that “the
private student loan industry—and particularly aviation
3. The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Rights of Consumers, Workers, and
Small Businesses?: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. S., 113th
Cong. 13–16 (2013) (statement of Alan Carlson).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2013).
7. Id. at 231 (holding that an arbitration agreement was enforceable
even though the costs of arbitration were prohibitively high as to make
arbitration an economically infeasible forum).
8. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 2.
9. The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Rights of Consumers, Workers, and
Small Businesses?: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. S., 113th
Cong. 309–312 (2013) (statement of Matthew Kilgore).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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schools—was a slowly unfolding disaster,” and yet continued to
do business with the flight school.12 Bound by an arbitration
agreement, Kilgore was denied his day in court to challenge the
bank’s corrupt practices and his loan accrued over $100,000 in
interest.13
“They know we are desperate for the cash, so we will do
whatever.”14 A single mother in San Francisco was a courier for
DoorDash in the spare hours she had between working as a
housekeeper and at a fast food restaurant.15 When Victoria Diltz
realized that DoorDash potentially had cheated her out of
thousands of dollars by classifying her as an independent
contractor,
she
attempted
to
enforce
her
federal
statutorily-guaranteed rights, but in a different way than other,
similarly situated individuals before her.16 Diltz and 5,019 other
Dashers filed individual demands for arbitration, forcing
DoorDash into its preferred dispute resolution forum and to pay
$9.5 million in filing fees.17 This is Mass Arbitration.
The United States Constitution, and all fifty-one
constitutions of the states and the District of Columbia,
guarantee the right to trial by jury for civil plaintiffs in resolving
disputes.18 Although the courtroom is commonly believed to be
the standard, if not the only, way to adjudicate disputes, the
right to a day in court can be contractually waived in favor of
arbitration.19 Arbitration waivers that involve interstate

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “Scared to Death” by
Arbitration: Companies Drowning in Their Own System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2020), https://perma.cc/9RCR-TN5G.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Nicholas Iovino, DoorDash Ordered to Pay $9.5M to Arbitrate 5,000
Labor
Disputes,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERV.
(Feb.
10,
2020),
https://perma.cc/JNS8-UWYK.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved . . . .”); e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24; MICH. CONST.
art. IV, § 27.
19. See Brian D. Weber, Contractual Waivers of a Right to Jury
Trial— Another Opinion, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 717, 718–22 (2006); City of
Cincinnati v. Bossert Mach. Co., 243 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ohio 1968).
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commerce are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).20
What began as a procedural statute mandating that federal
courts enforce arbitration agreements became a weapon for
corporate interests to undermine the civil litigation system.
Beginning in the 1980s, the defense bar, corporate interests, and
conservative lawmakers embarked on a decades-long crusade
through consumer and employee statutory rights—the
Arbitration Revolution.21 The Supreme Court, through a series
of misguided decisions, aided and abetted this crusade and held
that the FAA demanded the enforcement of egregiously
one-sided pre-dispute arbitration agreements, including ones
that forbade class treatment.22
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor penned a blunt rebuke to this
path: “[T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead,
case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”23 Aggrieved
individual after aggrieved individual pled with the Court to
allow them to hold corporations accountable for the wrongs they
committed. When the Court denied these cries for help,
plaintiffs took their fate into their own hands and embarked on
their own crusade through a blatantly one-sided system—Mass
Arbitration.
Mass Arbitration emerged as a way for injured consumers
and employees to bring meritorious claims against corporations
for wrongs that otherwise would have gone by the wayside.24
Highly-capitalized plaintiffs’ firms heeded corporate demands
and agreed to resolve disputes in arbitration.25 Now, relying on
the “consumer-friendly” provisions in these agreements, firms
front the fees in anticipation of reimbursement after a favorable
arbitration award.26 Small-dollar claims that otherwise would
never have been litigated are now being brought en masse in the
corporation’s handpicked resolution forum. Businesses are
20. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16).
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See infra Part I.B.2.
23. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.A.
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shell-shocked by plaintiffs turning their own system against
them. But, like any reprieve for the underdog, its time will soon
come to an end and Mass Arbitration 2.0 will take hold.
While many scholars have detailed the Arbitration
Revolution and its subsequent implications on substantive
rights enforcement,27 little scholarship exists regarding Mass
Arbitration. This Note argues that while Mass Arbitration
provides a window of opportunity for aggrieved claimants to
effectively resolve meritorious disputes, the defense bar will
circumvent its effects under the Supreme Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence.28 Part I provides a history of the Federal
Arbitration Act and the Arbitration Revolution, whereby the
Supreme Court interpreted the Act to prohibit class waivers in
mandatory arbitration agreements.29 Part II explains what
Mass Arbitration is and how it has materially changed the
arbitration landscape.30 Part III then analyzes potential
responses from the defense bar and hypothesizes how Mass
Arbitration 2.0 will look.31 Part IV focuses on concrete actions
that must be taken to ensure the longevity of the civil dispute
resolution system.32 This Note ultimately argues that the
Supreme Court’s current arbitration jurisprudence is
insufficient to adequately protect consumer and employee
rights. Absent congressional action, states should take matters
into their own hands to protect their citizens.33

27. See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the
Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101–09 (2006); Myriam Giles, The Day Doctrine Died:
Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 373 (2016).
See generally, e.g., David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
387 (2012) [hereinafter Horton, Unconscionability Wars]; J. Maria Glover,
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052
(2015) [hereinafter Glover, Disappearing Claims]; Hila Keren, Divided and
Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional Consequences of the
Arbitration Revolution, 72 FLA. L. REV. 575 (2020).
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part IV.C.
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OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT ARBITRATION LANDSCAPE

Congress designed the FAA to provide some much-needed
assurance that courts would enforce arbitration agreements
between sophisticated parties. While the Act seemingly served
its purpose for the first sixty years that it was in force, the
Supreme Court later broadened its scope, holding that it applies
to nearly all arbitration agreements that implicate interstate
commerce.34 The Arbitration Revolution—whereby the Supreme
Court and corporate interests nearly eliminated consumer and
employee rights—laid the foundation for Mass Arbitration.
A.

The Early Years of the FAA

In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA in response to the
judiciary’s reluctance, consistent with standard contract law, to
enforce mandatory arbitration provisions.35 Scholars have long
argued that Congress intended for the FAA to apply only to
sophisticated parties with equal bargaining strength,
attempting to resolve disputes in a cost- and time-efficient
manner.36 And, until the mid-1980s, courts enforced the FAA in
34. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12–13 (holding that the
FAA is substantive federal law and is binding on both federal and state courts
when interpreting covered arbitration agreements). Importantly, Section 1 of
the FAA exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 (emphasis added). The precise meaning of being engaged in “interstate
commerce,” however, is the subject of much litigation and debate. See Circuit
City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that the Section 1
“residual clause” applies only to “transportation workers”). But see Sw.
Airlines Co. v. Saxon, No. 21-309, 596 U.S. ___ (2022) (slip op., at 1) (“We think
it . . . plain that airline employees who physically load and unload cargo on
and off planes traveling in interstate commerce are, as a practical matter, part
of the interstate transportation of goods.”).
35. See Horton, Unconscionability Wars, supra note 27, at 391–92
(arguing that the revocability doctrine, which provided unilateral revocation
of arbitration agreements, was the reason for the judiciary’s refusal to enforce
arbitration agreements).
36. See Moses, supra note 27, 101–09 (2006); id. at 99–100 (arguing that
the FAA, as subsequently interpreted by the Court, “would not likely have
commanded a single vote in the 1925 Congress” (citing Paul D. Carrington &
Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401
(1996))); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 467 (1996) (“The unrebutted legislative
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conformity with this view: arbitration agreements between
parties with unequal bargaining strength were disallowed.37
Section 2 provides that written mandatory arbitration
agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract,” the latter part being the “savings” clause of the
statute.38 Accordingly, parties challenging arbitration clauses
typically argued that an applicable state contract law defense
would make the agreement unenforceable.39 Sections 3 and 4 of
the Act implement the substantive provision of Section 2.
Section 3 requires federal courts to stay any litigation subject to
an arbitration agreement and compel arbitration.40 Section 4
allows a party to petition the court to enforce an arbitration
agreement when one party refuses to comply.41
From its enactment until the 1980s, the FAA was a
procedural statute that governed how federal courts interpreted
and enforced arbitration agreements.42 Federal judges looked to
the Act for guidance to determine whether an arbitration
agreement must be enforced.43 In recent years, however, the
Supreme Court has continually reiterated that the primary
purpose of the Act is “to ensure that ‘private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.’”44 The Court
paired this interpretation of the FAA with the degradation of
the class action device, effectively eliminating small-dollar

history created prior to the FAA’s passage establishes that only disputes
arising out of commercial contracts were to be arbitrable . . . .”); see also
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R.
646 Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924).
37. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437–38 (1953).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
39. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339–41
(2011) (addressing a California state-law unconscionability defense); Am. Exp.
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2013) (arguing that high costs
of individually arbitration prevented the claimants from bringing demands for
arbitration).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
41. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
42. See Moses, supra note 27, at 110.
43. See id. at 112.
44. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682
(2010) (quoting Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
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claims as an effective mechanism to enforce federal statutory
rights.45
B.

The Supreme Court’s Blessing of the “Arbitration
Revolution”

Over the past forty years, the Supreme Court interpreted
the FAA to extend far beyond its original purpose. The Court
has transformed the Act from a purely procedural mechanism
applicable only in federal court into concrete substantive law
that applies in both state and federal court.46 This occurred even
though one of the principal drafters of the Act believed that it
would not affect state law or state courts whatsoever.47 The
Supreme Court, however, departed from this framework and

45. In 1966, Congress promulgated the modern class action device,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, to increase judicial efficiency in the
resolution of undifferentiated claims. See David Marcus, The History of the
Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 587, 590–91 (2013) (explaining that one of the initial perceptions of the
federal class action rule was that it would provide an “important substitute
for . . . public administration,” and effectively aggregate similar claims); id. at
596 (“If Rule 23 has any role to play in civil litigation, it must apply when class
members have undifferentiated, small value claims that they would never
litigate individually.”). Subsequently, incidences of aggregated civil litigation
nearly doubled between 1968 and 1977. Giles, supra note 27, at 373. In the
1980s, President Ronald Reagan, conservative lawmakers, and conservative
interest groups pushed back on what they thought was an attempt to “socialize
America” through a “litigation explosion” in which plaintiffs’ firms sought
windfall fees from excessive frivolous litigation. See Marc Galanter, The Day
After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5–7 (1986). President Reagan
ensured that his judicial nominees subscribed to his judicial philosophy—strict
constructionism and judicial restraint—to ensure the degradation of class
litigation. See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Legacy: Completing the
Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 319–20 (1989) (“Arguably, the
Reagan administration was engaged in the most systematic judicial
philosophical screening of judicial candidates ever seen in the nation’s
history . . .”). But see Jake Faleschini & Billy Corriher, Trump Is Disregarding
Senate Norms to Get His Judges on the Bench, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May
12, 2017), https://perma.cc/P3KR-MQWL (suggesting that President Donald
Trump’s method of selecting judicial nominees was intense and thorough,
although it did go against traditional presidential and senate norms).
46. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983) (“The effect of [Section 2 of the FAA] is to create a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement
within the coverage of the Act.”).
47. Id.
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transformed the Act into substantive law through a series of
injudicious opinions.48
1.

The End of the FAA as Procedural Law

In Southland Corp. v. Keating,49 decided in 1984, the Court
furthered the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration”50 and
held that the FAA applies as substantive federal law in both
federal and state courts.51 The Court looked to the FAA’s
legislative history and concluded that the phrase “contracts
involving interstate commerce” indicated that Congress
intended the Act to be more than a mere procedural statute.52
Previously, the FAA only governed how federal courts enforced
arbitration agreements, but Southland extended the statute to
state courts.53 With the FAA’s expansion in place, the defense
bar jumped on board, intentionally drafting and enforcing these
agreements to strip consumers and employees of their ability to
effectively vindicate meritorious claims.54
2.

The End of Class Treatment of Arbitration Disputes

Beginning in 2010, the arbitration landscape shifted in a
way that continues to be detrimental to private statutory
rights.55 In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal-Feeds International
Corp.,56 the parties had previously allowed an arbitration panel
to determine whether their arbitration agreement permitted
class-wide resolution where it was silent on the issue.57 The

48. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1984).
49. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
50. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
51. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 25.
52. See id. at 14 (“[T]o confine the Act’s scope to arbitrations sought to be
enforced in federal courts would frustrate what Congress intended to be a
broad enactment.”).
53. Id. at 865 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 776 (2004).
54. See Stempel, supra note 53, at 774.
55. See Moses, supra note 27, at 113.
56. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
57. See id. at 668.
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panel found that the agreement permitted it, but the Supreme
Court ultimately reversed this decision, finding that the panel
overstepped its authority.58 According to the Court, the panel
supplanted the terms of the arbitration agreement with its own
view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.59 Relying on the
premise that arbitration is “a matter of consent, not coercion,”60
the Court held that a party cannot be compelled to submit to
class arbitration absent an explicit agreement to do so.61 The
ruling was significant because it limited the availability of
class-wide adjudication, essentially giving corporations the
power to unilaterally veto class treatment.
One year later, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,62 the
Supreme Court again broadened the scope of the FAA and held
that the Act preempts general state law contract defenses if they
interfere with the “fundamental attributes of arbitration.”63 In
Concepcion, the plaintiff brought a putative class action suit
against AT&T alleging false advertising of “free cell phones”
because customers were charged $30 in sales tax.64 AT&T’s
consumer agreement contained an arbitration provision that
forbade class actions and class-wide arbitration.65 AT&T moved
to compel individual arbitration, and the plaintiffs argued that
the class arbitration provision was unconscionable because each
claim was so small that, without class treatment, the plaintiffs
would effectively be barred from bringing them.66
Relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Discover Bank v. Superior Court,67 the federal district court
determined
that
the
arbitration
agreement
was
68
unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
58. See id. at 672.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
61. See id. at 684.
62. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
63. Id. at 344.
64. Id. at 336–37.
65. See id. at 336.
66. See id. at 337.
67. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
68. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337–38 (stating that the district court
held the arbitration provision unconscionable because AT&T “had not shown
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court’s preemption ruling, stating that the Discover Bank rule
was simply “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis
applicable to contracts generally in California.”69 Because the
rule applied to class action waivers in all contracts and not just
arbitration agreements, it placed arbitration clauses on the
“exact same footing” as other contracts as the FAA required.70
At the Supreme Court, however, Justice Antonin Scalia,
writing for the majority, held that the FAA preempts the
Discover Bank rule because it “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”71 Scalia reasoned that the overarching
purpose of the Act is to “ensure the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings.”72 Whatever the “fundamental
attributes of arbitration” may be (the Court did not define them),
the majority reasoned that the Discover Bank rule ran afoul of
them.73 Concepcion made clear that a state cannot, through its
legislature or its courts, circumvent the mandate of the FAA by
relying on traditional state law contract defenses.74 The freedom
to contract, according to Justice Scalia, was such an ingrained
fundamental freedom that it overpowered any interest in the
apparent purpose of arbitrating in the first place.75
that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of
class actions”). In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court held that a
class action waiver in a mandatory arbitration agreement is unconscionable
when (i) the agreement is in a consumer contract of adhesion, (ii) the dispute
predictably involves a small-dollar claim, and (iii) the party with superior
bargaining power schemed to “deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers
out of individually small sums of money.” Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108–10.
69. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337.
70. See id. at 338.
71. Id. at 352 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
72. Id. at 344.
73. See id. at 337 (arguing that the Discover Bank rule adds additional
time and delay to litigation and supplants the FAA’s primary purpose of
ensuring the enforcement of arbitration agreements).
74. See id. at 343 (“Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”).
75. Id. But see MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 19 (2013) (“The
notion that a coerced or deceptive or completely covert divestment of an
entitlement might qualify as a ‘contract’ is paradoxical.”).
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In upholding the class waiver, the Supreme Court discussed
in dicta several “consumer-friendly” provisions in the
agreement.76 Pertinent to this Note, AT&T would (i) pay all costs
of arbitration for nonfrivolous claims, (ii) not seek
reimbursement for its attorneys’ fees, and (iii) pay a minimum
of $7,500 and double the plaintiff’ attorney’s fees if the
arbitration award was greater than their last written
settlement offer.77 While it is unclear whether the Court would
have decided differently if these provisions were absent from the
agreement,78 their presence provided a sufficient basis for the
Court to find that the plaintiffs were actually in a better position
in arbitration than they would be in the civil court system.79
This conclusion, however, relies on a faulty assumption: that
plaintiffs will be able to arbitrate small-dollar claims. In Justice
Stephen Breyer’s dissent, he agreed with the district court,
noting that “the realistic alternative to a class action is not 17
million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”80
In an apoplectic dissent, Justice Breyer contended that
Concepcion
directly
implicated
the
doctrine
of
unconscionability.81 The lack of class representation in
arbitration agreements had the effect of foreclosing plaintiffs’
ability to bring claims in the first place.82 Under the traditional
common law doctrine, the procedural nature of the
agreement—specifically how the contract was formed—is key to
determining its enforceability.83 In addition, the Court’s
majority implicated and essentially shredded the effective
vindication doctrine without explicitly mentioning it.84 As

76. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337 (2011).
77. Id.
78. See Memorandum from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, U.S. Supreme
Court Finds that Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements Are
Enforceable Under the Federal Arbitration Act 4 (Apr. 27, 2011),
https://perma.cc/D6F6-NBY3 (PDF).
79. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
80. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc.,
376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)).
81. Id. at 358–59.
82. Id. at 365.
83. See Horton, Unconscionability Wars, supra note 27, at 393.
84. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 357–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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discussed below, claimants can seemingly use the effective
vindication doctrine to defend against the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement if the terms are so egregiously one-sided
that enforcement would effectively eliminate a plaintiff’s ability
to vindicate their rights.85 For now, it appears that the
“consumer-friendly” provisions AT&T included in its consumer
agreement provided the Supreme Court with sufficient cover to
avoid invoking the unconscionability and effective vindication
doctrines.86 The question remains: What happens when
consumers, who likely do not know these provisions exist, put
them to the test?
The Court stated bluntly in Concepcion what it had only
hinted at in its previous FAA jurisprudence: the FAA applies not
only to parties with equal bargaining power, but broadly to all
arbitration agreements that implicate interstate commerce.87
The Court indicated that the holding would apply in the
employment context as well, expanding the reach of the its
misguided interpretation.88 The case also had major effects on
the redressability of claims and substantive law.89 At the time
of the decision, the defense bar accomplished what it long
sought: universal judicial enforcement of class waivers,
untethered by state law contract defenses.90 As discussed in Part
II.A, Concepcion and the Court’s subsequent arbitration
jurisprudence forced plaintiffs to find an innovative way to
enforce statutorily guaranteed rights.91
3.

The End of the Effective Vindication Doctrine—For Now

Five years later, the Supreme Court continued its
diminution of substantive rights enforcement and held that
arbitration agreements should be rigorously enforced according

85. See infra Part III.B.1.
86. See infra Part III.B.2.
87. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347 n.5.
88. See id.
89. See Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 27, at 3064–68; Keren,
supra note 27, at 578 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
FAA has “created a growing awareness that the process has had an immense
impact on matters of substantive law and issues of socio-economic justice”).
90. See Keren, supra note 27, at 578–79.
91. See infra Part II.A.
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to their terms.92 In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant,93 Alan Carlson, the owner of a small restaurant in
Oakland, California, sued for himself and on behalf of other
merchants who accepted American Express cards.94 Carlton
alleged violations of the Sherman Act95 and sought damages
under of the Clayton Act.96 The merchants argued that
American Express leveraged its monopoly power to force them
to accept their credit cards at fees 30 percent higher than other
credit card companies.97
Predictably, American Express moved to compel individual
arbitration as required by the Acceptance Agreement.98 In
response, the plaintiffs argued that the exorbitantly high costs
of antitrust litigation would effectively prohibit individual
arbitration.99 Indeed, an economist estimated that the cost of
expert testimony necessary to prove the antitrust claims100
might exceed one million dollars,101 while the maximum amount
an individual plaintiff could recover was $38,549 if the judge
awarded treble damages.102 American Express did not dispute
this fact.103 Even more egregiously, the arbitration agreement
had a strict confidentiality provision that prevented Italian
Colors from “informally arranging with other merchants to
produce a common expert report.”104 This economic inefficiency
served as a deterrent to potential plaintiffs who would otherwise
be entitled to relief under federal law.
92. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013).
93. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
94. Id.
95. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.)
96. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C.).
97. Italian Colors, 560 U.S. at 231.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 232.
100. See id. at 243 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[G]ood luck proving an
antitrust claim without [economic testimony]!”).
101. See id. at 231 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 231–32.
103. See In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.
2012).
104. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 246 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).

MASS ARBITRATION 2.0

1241

Despite these observations, the Court held that the
prohibitively high costs associated with arbitrating a statutory
claim do not affect the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement.105 The Court instead focused on the right to pursue
a statutory remedy and disregarded the necessary costs of
pursuing that remedy.106 So long as there remains some means
for plaintiffs to redress statutorily-provided causes of action, no
matter how impractical, arbitration provisions forbidding class
arbitration are enforceable.107 Under this reasoning, as long as
an agreement does not explicitly require a party to expressly
waive their right to pursue a specific statutory cause of action,
the agreement will not implicate the effective vindication
doctrine.108
More troubling was the Court’s complete disregard of the
importance of privately enforcing antitrust violations.109 Justice
Scalia, again writing for the majority, put it simply: “The
antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path
to the vindication of every claim.”110 When Congress drafted the
antitrust statutes, it evidenced an intention to include the
general public in the enforcement mechanisms and it was in “no
sense an afterthought; it was an integral part of the
congressional plan for protecting competition.”111
If properly applied, the effective vindication doctrine can
provide an avenue for plaintiffs to invalidate pre-dispute
arbitration agreements and push back against the elimination
of consumer-friendly provisions.112 In its current form, however,
what would eliminate a claimant’s “right” is purely subjective.113

105. See id. at 238.
106. See id. at 236.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 234.
109. See Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 27, at 3082–83.
110. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 233.
111. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990); see Italian
Colors, 570 U.S. at 241 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the purpose of the
Sherman Act’s private cause of action, among other things, was to promote
“the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws” (quoting
Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955))).
112. See infra Part IV.B.
113. Part IV.B., infra, proposes changes to the effective vindication
doctrine to account for this inconsistency.
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After Italian Colors, corporations can shield themselves from
these private enforcement mechanisms through pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.114
4.

The End of Collective Action Enforcement

The defense bar claimed yet another victory five years later
when the Court held that arbitration agreements in
employment contracts were enforceable even when the
employee brings a claim under the National Labor Relations
Act’s115 (NLRA) guaranteed right to collective action.116 In each
of the three consolidated cases in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,117
the employer and employee entered into mandatory individual
arbitration agreements to resolve employment disputes.118 The
employees sued in federal district court, alleging wage theft
under the Fair Labor Standards Act119 (FLSA). When the
employers attempted to compel arbitration, the plaintiffs
argued that enforcement of the arbitration agreement would
violate the FLSA, and that the NRLA’s collective bargaining
guarantee supplanted the mandate of the FAA.120 In a 5–4
decision, the Supreme Court, held that the FAA must be
enforced and neither the FLSA nor the NRLA precluded the
agreements’ enforcement.121 Consistent with Concepcion and
Italian Colors, the Court’s holding solidified the FAA’s
applicability to the adjudication of explicit statutory causes of
action, all but eliminating employees’ ability to bring collective
actions
for
wage
theft,
discrimination,
or
other
employment-related disputes.122
114. See John L. Schwab, The Vindication of Rights Doctrine: Still a Key
to the Courtroom or Arbitration’s Latest Casualty?, 15 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 243,
254 (2015).
115. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49. Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 157–169).
116. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018).
117. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
118. See id. at 1619–20.
119. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201–219).
120. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1622.
121. Id. at 1632.
122. See J. Maria Glover, Mass Arbitration, 74 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (manuscript at 22) (on file with author) (explaining that Epic Systems
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Each of the cases discussed above added a brick in the wall,
obscuring from consumers and employees the ability to
effectively sue corporations for otherwise legally sufficient
claims of injury. To summarize, the Supreme Court has held
that the Federal Arbitration Act (i) created a federal policy
favoring arbitration;123 (ii) is substantive law applicable in both
state and federal courts;124 (iii) requires the parties to an
arbitration agreement to explicitly agree to class arbitration;125
(iv) preempts state contract law defenses that “frustrate [the]
purpose” of the Act, despite the explicit inclusion of common law
defenses in the statute;126 and (v) applies even where federal
statutes guarantee seemingly conflicting rights.127 The
arbitration landscape isolates aggrieved claimants and
forecloses nearly every mechanism by which they can have a day
in court.128 Contrary to the Court’s vision in Italian Colors, the
“some means” to vindicate statutory rights has proven
insufficient.
C.

Effects of the Arbitration Revolution

The perpetual expansion of the FAA was termed one of the
“most profound shifts in our legal history.”129 Today, arbitration
agreements regularly appear in contracts of adhesion,130 binding
consumers and employees absent an objection in a specified

represents the idea that “[c]orporate entities could use private procedural
ordering to avoid civil liability for wrongdoing”).
123. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983).
124. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1984).
125. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684
(2010).
126. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347 n.6 (2011).
127. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627–28 (2018).
128. See infra Part I.C.
129. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 2 (quoting Judge William
G. Young, a federal judge appointed by President Ronald Reagan).
130. See Horton, Unconscionability Wars, supra note 27, at 392 (defining
an “adhesion contract” as a contract that is “nonnegotiated” and “unilaterally
drafted”).
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period.131 Although consumers can withdraw from a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement, doing so eliminates their ability to enjoy
the business’s products and services.132 Likewise, because
employers present these contracts in a take-it-or-leave-it
fashion, employees who wish to not be bound will likely lose
their jobs. Some argue that these agreements are efficient,
reducing litigation costs and passing the savings on from
corporations to employees through higher wages and to
consumers through lower prices.133 The data does not support
this contention.134
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority in
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,135 argued
that because arbitration lacks the “procedural rigor and
appellate review of the courts,” parties in bilateral agreements
can realize the benefits of arbitration: “lower costs, greater
efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert
adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”136 While Justice
Alito argued that the principles of bilateral arbitration—two
parties resolving a dispute in a civilized and efficient
manner—make it ostensibly superior to traditional litigation,
parties can only reap the supposed benefits of arbitration if it
can be commenced. Unfortunately, with the Supreme Court’s
approval of the arbitration and class waiver agreements in
Concepcion, Italian Colors, and Epic Systems, many
corporations adopted arbitration procedures that mirror those

131. See Anjanette Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect
Consumers from Significantly One-Sided Arbitration Clauses Within
Contracts of Adhesion, 91 NEB. L. REV. 666, 667–69 (2013).
132. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346–47 (“The times in which consumer
contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”); Michael L.
DeMichele & Richard A. Bales, Unilateral-Modification Provisions in
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. J. 63, 69.
133. See, e.g., Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1216 (2003) (discussing arguments
that support the widespread use of contracts of adhesion).
134. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY FACT SHEET 3
(2015), https://perma.cc/7Z35-HR5Z (PDF) (“The CFPB found no statistically
significant evidence that the companies that eliminated their arbitration
clauses increased their prices . . . relative to those that made no change in
their use of arbitration clauses.”).
135. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
136. Id. at 685.
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agreements, effectively eliminating a plaintiff’s right to trial by
jury.137
The immediate effects of the Supreme Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence were profound. Not only did corporations
subsequently include provisions that mandated arbitration, but
they dramatically tilted the scale in their favor by limiting the
scope of discovery in the arbitral forum,138 shortening the
statute of limitations for claims, and, most importantly for this
Note, prohibiting class-wide litigation.139 Class waivers
provided the foundation of the Arbitration Revolution and Mass
Arbitration.140
Pre-dispute arbitration is attractive to businesses because
they can craft an adjudication system with more advantageous
procedural rules than those that exist in court.141 In a 2004
study, researchers analyzed major corporations’ use of
arbitration provisions across thirty-seven industries.142 The
results showed that 69.2% of businesses in the financial sector
included arbitration clauses in their consumer agreements.143
After the 2008 Financial Crisis, members of Congress were
greatly concerned about the effect of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements on consumer rights.144 In response, in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act,145 Congress required the Consumer Financial Protection

137. See infra Part III.B.
138. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir.
2005).
139. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
140. See infra Part II.A.
141. See Stephen J. Ware, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, § 2.3(c)
(2001) (“Not only does the parties’ contract determine whether a dispute goes
to arbitration, the contract also determines what occurs during
arbitration . . . .”).
142. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s
Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 58–62 (2004).
143. Id. at 62. The study defined “financial category” to include credit card
providers, banking institutions, and tax consultant services. Id. at 59.
144. F. Paul Bland & Gabriel Hopkins, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Considering Important Rule on Arbitration Agreements, ADVOC. MAG.
(Feb. 2016), https://perma.cc/RRQ3-XKY7.
145. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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Bureau (CFPB) to study the impact of these agreements in the
consumer finance sector.146 Subsequently, the Court decided
Concepcion and the scope of the Bureau’s report increased.147
The CFPB released its preliminary results on pre-dispute
arbitration clauses and found a significant increase in their use
across a multitude of industries.148
Beyond consumer agreements, the prevalence of class
waivers
in
employment
contracts
also
increased
substantially.149 In the 1990s, a mere 2% of nonunion employee
agreements contained arbitration provisions.150 Today, the
situation is significantly worse. According to a 2017 study, “[t]he
percentage of nonunion, private-sector employees covered
by . . . mandatory-arbitration clauses has more than doubled
since the early 2000s.”151 Approximately 60.1 million American
workers no longer have access to courts to adjudicate their legal
employment rights and instead must file arbitration claims.152
A 2019 study found that eighty-one of the one hundred
largest companies in the United States use arbitration in their
consumer agreements—seventy-eight of which contain class
waivers.153 In 2019 alone, these agreements allowed employers
to pocket $9.2 billion from workers who made less than thirteen
dollars per hour, disproportionately affecting women and people
of color.154 The alarm was so great that the CFPB implemented

146. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a).
147. See Bland & Hopkins, supra note 144.
148. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY
RESULTS (12–15) (2013) [hereinafter CFPB Preliminary Results],
https://perma.cc/FYM5-BYQL (PDF).
149. Jacob Gershman, As More Companies Demand Arbitration
Agreements, Sexual Harassment Claims Fizzle, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2018, 5:30
AM), https://perma.cc/4Z78-FEK4.
150. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 4 (2018), https://perma.cc/2EGE-QJY3 (PDF).
151. Gershman, supra note 149.
152. COLVIN, supra note 150, at 5.
153. Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration
Agreements by America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233,
238 (2019).
154. See HUGH BARAN & ELISABETH CAMPBELL, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT,
FORCED ARBITRATION HELPED EMPLOYERS WHO COMMITTED WAGE THEFT
POCKET $9.2 BILLION IN 2019 FROM WORKERS IN LOW-PAID JOBS 1 (2021),
https://perma.cc/8BRP-NTWY (PDF).
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a rule that would prohibit certain financial companies from
including pre-dispute arbitration agreements in their consumer
agreements.155 However, Congress passed, and then-President
Donald J. Trump signed, a joint resolution disapproving of the
final rule, resulting in its removal from the Code of Federal
Regulations.156
The rapidly increased use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
Supreme Court’s misguided interpretation of the FAA. The
Court has consistently viewed the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement under the FAA as a matter of “consent, not
coercion.”157 It is illogical, however, that a consumer or employee
consented to resolve disputes in arbitration when the
agreements are in contracts of adhesion. In a strange twist of
fate, businesses are now on their back foot, wondering what they
consented to in these arbitration contracts. Plaintiffs have
begun to leverage arbitration provisions en masse to inflict
maximum cost on corporate defendants. It is possible that the
rise of Mass Arbitration could force businesses to retreat from
their forty-year crusade through consumer and employee
substantive rights.
II.

WHAT IS MASS ARBITRATION?

In recent years, plaintiffs’ attorneys have acquiesced to the
Supreme Court’s demand that arbitration agreements be
“enforced according to their terms.”158 After all, the defense bar
spent the better part of the last four decades carefully crafting
a favorable body of law in hopes of shielding its corporate clients
from liability for wrongdoing against consumers and
155. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017)
(previously codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1040).
156. Joint Resolution of Disapproval, Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243
(2017).
157. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681
(2010) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)); see also, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (“[P]arties are generally free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
158. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013); Epic
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018).
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employees.159 In doing so, the drafters of the agreements
included consumer-friendly provisions to mask the
near-complete degradation of viable avenues to hold businesses
responsible.160
Conforming to the letter, but not the spirit, of the Court’s
FAA jurisprudence, plaintiffs’ attorneys compiled thousands of
individual claims against companies, filing demands for
arbitration en masse.161 This recent phenomenon has been
termed Mass Arbitration—the “ultimate Judo move”162—and
reawakened corporate dispute resolution.163 Mass Arbitration is
“both a response to and a product of a decades-long campaign by
defense-side interests to dismantle the infrastructure for
enforcing substantive rights.”164 Professor Maria Glover argues
that Mass Arbitration has four principal elements:
(1) leveraging arbitration fees and fee-shifting provisions in
arbitration agreements; (2) arbitrating individual claims—or
credibly threatening to do so—to impose asymmetrical costs
on defendants; (3) selecting higher-threshold-value
individual claims . . . ; [and] (4) generating aggregate
settlements from a mass of individual claims . . . .165

These four elements provide the framework for Mass
Arbitration and any deviation could cause the machine to
cease.166 The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has
recognized the increase in Mass Arbitration claims and recently

159. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 4).
160. See generally Myriam Giles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining
“Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2012).
161. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 4).
162. David Horton, All Alone in Arbitration, 72 FLA. L. REV. F. 75, 80 (2021)
[hereinafter Horton, All Alone in Arbitration].
163. See id.; Memorandum from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, As Mass
Arbitrations Proliferate, Companies Have Deployed Strategies for Deterring
and Defending Against Them 1 (May 24, 2021) [hereinafter Gibson Dunn Mass
Arbitration Advisory], https://perma.cc/L8W3-H593 (PDF) (“Mass arbitration
is a recent phenomenon in which thousands of plaintiffs—often consumers,
employees, or independent contractors—bring arbitration demands against a
company at the same time.”).
164. Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 4).
165. Id. (manuscript at 64).
166. See id. (manuscript at 64–65).
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adopted a sliding scale for consumer arbitration fees.167 States
have enacted “representative claim” statutes, such as the
California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA),168 to protect
their citizens from the harsh effects of arbitration.169 The
legality of these statutes is currently before the Supreme
Court.170 While the long-term effects of this change are unclear,
these responses reflect the recognition of the potential
widespread effects of Mass Arbitration.
A.

How Did Mass Arbitration Become a Reality?

While the mechanics of the Mass Arbitration strategy are
constantly developing, some hallmark characteristics have
already formed. Critically, plaintiff attorneys have leveraged
fee-shifting arbitration fee-shifting provisions to push Mass
Arbitration into action. To avoid the invalidation of arbitration
agreements, businesses include claimant-friendly provisions,
such as those that require them to pay all upfront arbitration
fees.171 This is the heart of Mass Arbitration: plaintiffs’ firms’
ability to recover costs from defendant corporations.172 While
some argue that arbitration agreements have led to a more
efficient resolution of disputes between parties,173 a sweeping
consequence was the near elimination of small-dollar claims
brought by consumers and employees.174 The most
straightforward explanation for this result is the balancing of
the exorbitantly high costs of effectively arbitrating a negative
value claim against the low rate of return.175 It was not until the
167. See Mark Levin, New AAA Consumer Fee Schedule Addresses Mass
Arbitration Costs, JDSUPRA (Mar. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/4QPB-LL6T.
168. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–2699.6 (West 2016).
169. See infra Part II.D.
170. See infra Part II.D.
171. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337 (2011).
172. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 64).
173. See Letter from Neil L. Bradley, Exec. Vice President & Chief Pol’y
Officer, Chamber of Com. of the United States of America, to Jerrold Nadler,
Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary, & Jim Jordan, Ranking
Member, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://perma.cc/CQ72-7B5Q (PDF).
174. Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 4).
175. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 305, 342–43 (2015) (“Most class actions seeking money damages
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advent of highly-capitalized plaintiffs’ firms willing to cover the
initial arbitration costs with hopes of prevailing that the
possibility of litigating these small-dollar claims became more
than an illusory “right.”176
Armed with some of the best civil defense attorneys in the
country, Keller Lenkner LLC (“Keller Lenkner”) financed
thousands of arbitration claims against large corporations such
as Uber, Postmates, and Amazon.177 Well-funded firms such as
Keller Lenkner are necessary cogs in the Mass Arbitration
machine because they pay the upfront filing fees in anticipation
that once they prevail, the corporation will reimburse them and
pay their attorney’s fees per the terms of the arbitration
agreement.178 For example, Keller Lenkner paid approximately
$8 million to the AAA to initiate the arbitration claims against
Intuit Turbo Tax (“Intuit”).179 The firm was able to leverage
Intuit’s promise to reimburse successful arbitration fees in order
to initiate a Mass Arbitration.180 The defense bar will no doubt
respond to this plaintiff-friendly exploitation of arbitration
agreements; however, before focusing on that response, it is
important to briefly survey the current landscape of Mass
Arbitration and how some corporations have already addressed
it on an individual basis.
represent individuals with negative value claims. An individual claim has a
negative value when the litigation costs to bring it would exceed the possible
benefit from suit.”); see also David Marcus, Making Adequacy More Adequate,
88 TEX. L. REV. 137, 143 (2010) (“Because no rational class member would
bring her own individual [negative value] suit under these circumstances, the
value of a recovery in an individual action . . . is zero.”); e.g., Concepcion, 563
U.S. at 337; Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231–32
(2013).
176. See Gerchen Keller Capital, LLC Launches New $250 Million
Commercial Litigation Finance Fund, GERCHEN KELLER CAP., LLC (Jan. 13,
2014, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/W8CX-Z2KJ.
177. See Scott Medintz, How Consumers Are Using Mass Arbitration to
Fight Amazon, Intuit, and Other Corporate Giants, CONSUMER REPS. (Aug. 13,
2021), https://perma.cc/45Q7-E4CN.
178. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337.
179. Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Intervene at 7, In re Intuit Free
File Litig., No. 3:19-cv-02546 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020), ECF No. 189.
180. See Declaration of Rodger R. Cole in Support of Defendant’s
Opposition to Motion to Intervene ¶ 17, In re Intuit Free File Litig., No.
3:19-cv-02546 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020), ECF No. 192 (“Keller does not recover
the filing fees and collects no attorney’s fees unless it obtains recovery for its
clients.”); see also Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 64).
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Mass Arbitration in Action

Chipotle, along with many other employers, requires its
employees to sign arbitration agreements that prohibit class
treatment for all claims, including discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964181 and allegations of wage
theft under FLSA.182 Nearly three thousand employees brought
a collective action suit against Chipotle, alleging that the
company had general policies and practices that required
employees to work “off the clock.”183 The company attempted to
force them into arbitration, relying on the terms of its standard
employment agreement.184 After multiple years of litigating the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement, and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Epic Systems, the judge granted Chipotle’s
motion to compel and ordered the parties to resolve the dispute
in arbitration.185 When one-hundred-and-fifty employees heeded
Chipotle’s demands and filed individual arbitration demands,186
Chipotle pleaded with the court to stay the arbitration
proceedings, and said if the court did not, it would suffer
“irreparable harm.”187 The judge promptly denied the request
and the parties proceeded to confidential arbitration.188 Chipotle
181. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
182. See Dave Jameison, Chipotle’s Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Are
Backfiring Spectacularly, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2018, 3:09 PM),
https://perma.cc/HEP6-2F9H. See generally Collective Action Complaint,
Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02612 (D. Colo. Sep. 22,
2014), ECF No. 1.
183. Collective Action Complaint, supra note 182, ¶¶ 35–36.
184. See Defendant’s Supplemental Brief in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss at 2, Turner, No. 1:14-cv-02612 (D. Colo. April 16, 2018), ECF No. 182.
185. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, Turner, No.
1:14-cv-02612 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2018), ECF No. 187; Michael Hiltzik, Column,
Chipotle May Have Outsmarted Itself by Blocking Thousands of Employee
Lawsuits over Wage Theft, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/8CUQ-BTMT (explaining the house of cards Chipotle built
and how it imploded).
186. Jameison, supra note 182.
187. Defendant’s Motion to Stay Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 6–9, Turner, No. 14-cv-02614 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2018), ECF No. 198.
The title of this filing bleeds irony, further supporting the argument that
defendants are fearful of Mass Arbitration.
188. See Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Entry of Judgement and
Motion to Reinstate Stay at 1, Turner, No. 14-cv-02614 (D. Colo. Nov. 20,
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was forced to reckon with its own system of dispute
resolution—one it never thought would come to fruition.
Intuit, a giant in the self-tax-preparation industry, suffered
its own dose of Mass Arbitration. In 2019, consumers filed a
class action lawsuit against Intuit, alleging that the company
steered individuals away from free tax services which would
have sufficiently served the individual’s needs and toward
purchasing upgraded services.189 Intuit moved to compel
arbitration, relying on its consumer agreement that mandated
arbitration to resolve any dispute between it and its
customers.190 The court granted the motion, finding that the
plaintiffs signed mandatory individual arbitration agreements
and there were no applicable contract defenses that would
permit the court to depart from the FAA’s demand to “rigorously
enforce” agreements of that nature.191 Intuit got what it wished
for and the claims were forced into arbitration—but not without
the significant costs the company agreed to pay.192 As of late
2020, Intuit owed approximately $23 million in arbitration fees
after already paying over $13 million.193 To avoid arbitrating the
large number of cases filed, Intuit reached a preliminary
settlement agreement with a plaintiffs’ firm that would apply to
a group of individuals harmed.194
Before Intuit could jam through the settlement, Keller
Lenkner filed arbitration demands for 125,000 individual
consumers alleging the same fraudulent business practices.195

2018), ECF No. 212; Jameison, supra note 182 (“[T]his is their worst-case
scenario, apparently—and the scenario they asked for.”).
189. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶¶ 20–33, In re
Intuit Free File Litig., No. 3:19-cv-02546 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2019), ECF No. 1.
190. Motion to Compel Arbitration at 7, In re Intuit Free File Litig., No.
3:19-cv-02546 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2019), ECF No. 97.
191. See Alison Frankel, Intuit Defends $40 Million Class Settlement,
Attacks Mass Arbitration Firm, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2020, 5:42 PM) [hereinafter
Frankel, Intuit Defends $40 Million Settlement], https://perma.cc/7YHLYZXW.
192. See id.
193. See Alison Frankel, Judge Breyer Rejects $40 Million Intuit Class
Settlement Amid Arbitration Onslaught, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2020, 5:09 PM)
[hereinafter
Frankel,
Judge
Breyer
Rejects
Intuit
Settlement],
https://perma.cc/WW6A-6YYV.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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The firm strongly opposed the settlement agreement, arguing
that Intuit could not unilaterally rescind the arbitration
agreement in circumstances in which the company found it
advantageous to do so.196 Intuit accused Keller Lenkner of being
“unethical” when the firm sought to exclude their clients from
the agreement.197 Keller Lenkner forced Intuit to face Mass
Arbitration. Evidently, Intuit found it more advantageous to
pursue a global settlement agreement than to adjudicate the
claims through arbitration, its own handpicked means to
adjudicate disputes.198 But Intuit surely would not be the last
company to experience the effects of Mass Arbitration.
In 2019, more than five thousand DoorDash couriers filed
individual arbitration demands with the AAA, alleging that
DoorDash misclassified them as independent contractors in
violation of FLSA and the California Labor Code.199 Each
individual demand contained specific factual allegations and
was filed on the AAA’s arbitration demand form.200 The
plaintiffs’ firm paid filing fees totaling more than $1.2 million,
after which the AAA ordered DoorDash to pay its share—$12
million—as required by the arbitration agreement.201 DoorDash
argued that because of “deficiencies” in the arbitration
demands, it was under no obligation to do so, and would not pay
the required fees.202 The AAA administratively closed the file.203
196. Alison Frankel, Mass Arbitration Firm Scrambles to Keep 125,000
Clients Out of $40 Million Intuit Class Action, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2020, 10:53
AM) [hereinafter Frankel, Mass Arbitration Firm Avoids Class Actions],
https://perma.cc/C4KJ-FZJX.
197. Id.
198. See Frankel, Intuit Defends $40 Million Settlement, supra note 191;
infra Part III.A.
199. Petition for Order Compelling Arbitration ¶ 22, Abernathy v.
DoorDash, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-07545 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2019), ECF No. 1.
200. Motion to Compel Arbitration at 1, Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438
F. Supp. 3d 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (No. C 19-07545).
201. Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1064 (N.D. Cal.
2020).
202. Id.
203. The remedy available when a defendant refuses to pay arbitration
fees is unclear. Compare Brown v. Dillard’s, Inc., 430 F.3d 1004, 1010, 1013
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Dillard’s breached its agreement with the plaintiff
when it refused to partake in arbitration), with Cinel v. Barna, 142 Cal. Rptr.
3d 329, 334 (Cal. App. 2012) (holding the defendant waived its right to
arbitration by refusing to resolve a fee dispute).
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The next day, DoorDash circulated an updated contractor
agreement to its couriers.204 Not coincidentally, this new
agreement removed the AAA as the arbitration provider and
replaced it with the International Institute for Conflict
Prevention & Resolution (IICPR).205 But a forum change comes
with a rule change—and that rule change dramatically favors
defendants in Mass Arbitration.206
DoorDash couriers filed a petition for an order to compel
DoorDash to arbitrate and to require the company to pay the
filing fees.207 When granting the plaintiffs’ motion, the court
stated: “You are going to pay that money. You don’t want to pay
millions of dollars, but that’s what you bargained to do and
you’re going to do it.”208 Interestingly enough, here the “little
guy” was the one attempting to compel arbitration and
DoorDash was fighting tooth and nail not to have its
handcrafted agreement enforced. The facts of this case illustrate
that the defense bar and corporations immediately recognized
the threat of Mass Arbitration and scrambled to deter its effects.
Ultimately, Mass Arbitration will likely force businesses to
change their standard agreements.209 While they may do this
204. Alison Frankel, DoorDash Accused of Changing Driver Rules to Block
Mass Arbitration Campaign, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2019, 6:34 PM),
https://perma.cc/FB6P-7G67 [hereinafter Frankel, DoorDash Accused of
Changing Driver Rules]; Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order,
Abernathy at 7–9, No. 3:19-cv-07545 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2019), ECF No 10.
205. See Frankel, DoorDash Accused of Changing Driver Rules, supra note
204.
206. Three days before DoorDash updated its contractor agreement with
the new arbitration provider, the IICPR published its “Employment-Related
Mass-Claims Protocol.” See CPR Launches New Claims Protocol and
Procedure, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (Nov. 6, 2016),
https://perma.cc/SVT9-B2Q9. This updated protocol applies when “greater
than 30 individual employment-related arbitration cases of a nearly identical
nature are, or have been, filed with CPR against the same Respondent(s),” and
where the parties have agreed to arbitrate the case according to the rules
governing CPR arbitrations. EMPLOYMENT-RELATED MASS-CLAIMS PROTOCOL 2,
INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., https://perma.cc/YD3H-6F7Z
(PDF). Cases are of a nearly identical nature “if they arise out of a factual
scenario and raise legal issues so similar one to another that application of the
Protocol to the number of cases at issue will reasonably result in an efficient
and fair adjudication of the cases.” Id. at 2.
207. Id.
208. Iovino, supra note 17.
209. See infra Part III.
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using the same techniques they used to dismantle the class
action device, key differences between the two mechanisms will
make this difficult to accomplish.
C.

The Moral Conundrum of Class Actions and Mass
Arbitration

To attempt to combat Mass Arbitration, the corporate
defense bar characterizes it as it does class actions—a
mechanism that enables plaintiffs to force defendants into
settling meritless claims to avoid the daunting costs of
litigation. A study of Mass Arbitration disputes does not support
this characterization.210 The adoption of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 caused a major shakeup to the civil litigation
system.211 In response to the steady increase of class action suits
filed, Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit said that class
actions force defendants into “blackmail settlements,”212
whereby plaintiffs’ firms bring thousands of “frivolous” claims
and threaten to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), forcing
corporate defendants to settle the claims to avoid exorbitant
litigation costs.213 The daunting threat of blackmail settlements
led the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to amend
Rule 23 to allow interlocutory appeal of class certifications.214
Out of the despondent fear that corporations were flooded with
meritless class action lawsuits, there was a massive push to
prohibit class treatment in consumer and employee
agreements.215 Judges further limited the availability of Rule 23
class actions through heightened certification requirements.216
Although defense bar advocates argued that Mass
Arbitration provides the same “blackmail settlement” regime as
210. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 109–10).
211. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 592 (characterizing the modern class
action rule as revolutionary and calling it an “American story”).
212. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120
(1973).
213. See Horton, All Alone in Arbitration, supra note 162, at 80.
214. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment.
215. See supra Part I.C.
216. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 18) (characterizing the
judiciary’s motivation in creating elevated certification requirements as
“judges’ empathy for corporate defendants subject to the class action’s
tendency to impose settlement pressure”).
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Rule 23(b)(3), the evidence simply does not support the
contention that claims brought through Mass Arbitration are
frivolous.217 Quite the opposite is true. Mass Arbitration has
provided an avenue for consumers to enforce statutory rights
and employees to adjudicate claims under the FLSA, NLRA, and
Title VII, when they otherwise would not have the ability to
bring these meritorious claims.218Plaintiffs’ law firms bear a
significant risk when they agree to pay millions of dollars in
filing fees to initiate arbitration on behalf of their clients.219
Assuming that these firms make economically rational
decisions, they would not agree to pay the fees if they did not
have a strong belief that the underlying disputes are
meritorious and an expectation of prevailing in arbitration.220
The “blackmail settlement” argument falls flat when applied to
Mass Arbitration because the claims, as of now, are meritorious
and the financial incentives to “scheme” the system are not
present.
D.

The Peculiar Case of the California Private Attorneys
General Act

California’s Labor Code provides an interesting wrinkle in
squaring Mass Arbitration with the Supreme Court’s
arbitration jurisprudence. The California PAGA permits
employees to sue to recover civil judgments against their
employers for violating state labor laws.221 Judgments are split
between the State of California and the aggrieved employee—75
percent going to the State and 25 percent split among the
aggrieved employees.222 Similar to Rule 23, the California PAGA

217. See id. (manuscript at 111) (“Corporate interests have waged a
methodical, relentless campaign to characterize ‘small’ claims as frivolous and
to eliminate them.”).
218. See, e.g., Petition for Order Compelling Arbitration, supra note 199,
¶ 1.
219. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 13).
220. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 559 U.S. 662,
676–77 (2010) (arguing that the parties were “in complete agreement
regarding their intent” and therefore knew the costs and benefits of initiating
arbitration).
221. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–2699.6 (West 2016).
222. Id. § 2699(i).
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does not confer substantive rights,223 but rather is a procedural
mechanism that provides an avenue for aggrieved employees to
enforce the California Labor Code where the state could have
brought a claim, but chose not to do so.224
This enforcement regime raises the question of whether the
PAGA applies to employees who “agreed” to individually
arbitrate claims with their employers. In one sense, such actions
are representative claims, insofar as the claim is brought by one
employee on behalf of all similarly situated employees.225
Because the plaintiff in PAGA litigation acts as an agent of an
absent state agency,226 the principles of collateral estoppel bind
both the aggrieved employee and the state to the judgment.227
Therefore, it operates similarly to the class action device, but
differs in the applicability of the Supreme Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence. Faced with the threat of these claims, employers
immediately hit the ground running to challenge the
constitutionality of the mechanism. While some potential
defendants relish the idea of getting these claims resolved once
and for all and binding the state to the judgment, most are
daunted by the mechanism by which the result occurs.
In 2014, the Supreme Court of California held that
employers cannot require employees to waive their rights to

223. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Loc. 1756 v. Superior Ct., 209 P.3d
937, 943 (Cal. 2009) (comparing the mechanisms employed in Rule 23 with
those in the California PAGA).
224. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a). Prior to filing a representative claim
lawsuit, the aggrieved employee must provide notice to both their employer
and the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”). Id.
§ 2699.3(a)(1)(A). Only if the LWDA fails to respond or declines to intervene
can the employee file the lawsuit. Id. § 2699.3(a)(2).
225. Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA)—Filing, CAL. DEP’T INDUS.
RELS. (Dec. 2020), https://perma.cc/VP62-QW4M.
226. See, e.g., Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 148
(Cal. 2014) (“[California is] always the real party of interest in the suit.”).
227. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894–95 (2008) (holding that a
nonparty is bound by a judgment if that party was adequately represented by
a party with the same interests to the suit); see, e.g., Arias v. Superior Ct., 209
P.3d 923, 933 (Cal. 2009) (“[A] judgment in an employee’s action under the act
binds not only that employee but also the state labor law enforcement
agencies.”).
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representative claims under the California PAGA,228 and that
such a prohibition does not “frustrate the purpose” of the FAA.229
In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC,230 an
employee agreed to resolve disputes with their employer
through mandatory bilateral arbitration.231 The agreement
prohibited class action lawsuits in addition to representative
PAGA claims.232 Following violations of the California Labor
Code, the employee brought a class action suit and a
representative PAGA action against their employer, CLS
Transportation Los Angeles.233 After litigation on the
enforceability of the waiver, the Supreme Court of California
held that the employer’s class action waiver was indeed
enforceable.234
By contrast, the court held that the PAGA waiver was
unenforceable.235 Because the PAGA is intended to supplement
insufficient resources to enforce labor laws, such a waiver would
“disable one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the
[California] Labor Code.”236 In reconciling this holding with the
United States Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence, the court
drew a distinction between the FAA and the PAGA. While the
FAA governs resolution of disputes between private parties, the
California PAGA is intended to efficiently resolve disputes
between an employer and the state Labor and Workforce
Development Agency.237 Corporate defendants flocked to the
Supreme Court, challenging the Iskanian rule.238
228. See Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 149 (holding that an employment
agreement that compels the waiver of claims under the PAGA is contrary to
public policy and unenforceable under California state law).
229. See id.
230. 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014).
231. Id. at 133.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 142–43.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 149.
237. See id. (“[T]he rule against PAGA waivers does not frustrate the
FAA’s objectives . . . because the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the
resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an
employer and the state.”).
238. In 2018, a Postmates delivery driver filed a PAGA complaint in
California state court alleging that, in violation of the California Labor Code,
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In Viking River Cruises v. Moriana,239 the Supreme Court
decided whether the FAA mandates the enforcement of PAGA
representative claim waivers.240 Angie Moriana, a former sales
representative employed by Viking River Cruises (“Viking”),
filed a PAGA lawsuit alleging that Viking failed to provide her
with her final wages within seventy-two hours of termination,
as required by the California Labor Code.241 The PAGA
complaint also documented various violations of the Code
allegedly sustained by other Viking employees.242 Similar to
many employees in the United States, Moriana was required to
sign an arbitration agreement that contained a class action
waiver as a condition of her employment.243 Consequently,
Viking moved to dismiss the representative PAGA claims and
compel arbitration of Moriana’s “individual” PAGA

Postmates improperly classified delivery personnel as independent
contractors. Alison Frankel, Beset by Arbitration Demands, Postmates Resorts
to Class Action to Settle Couriers’ Claims, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2019, 5:47 PM)
[hereinafter
Frankel,
Postmates
Resorts
to
Class
Actions],
https://perma.cc/ZY4F-CFZM. After failing to compel arbitration, Postmates
petitioned the Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. See generally Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Postmates, LLC v. Rimler, No. 21-119 (U.S. July 26,
2021). Shortly thereafter, Postmates notified the Court that it had reached a
tentative settlement agreement with the plaintiffs and continued to request
extensions for its response. Motion to Extend Time to File Response at 1,
Postmates, No. 21-119 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2022). In the October 2021 term, two
other Petitions for Writs of Certiorari were filed, asking the Supreme Court to
address the identical issue. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lyft,
Inc. v. Seifu, No. 21-742 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2021); Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Coverall, N. Am., Inc. v. Rivas, No. 21-268 (U.S. Aug. 20, 2021).
239. No. 21-119, 596 U.S. ___ (2022).
240. Viking River Cruises filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari presenting
the identical question in Postmates. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Viking
River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, No. 20-1573, 596 U.S. ___ (May 10, 2021) (“The
question presented is: Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires
enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee
cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.”).
241. No. 21-119, 596 U.S. ___ (2022) (slip op., at 1).
242. These included provisions addressing overtime, rest periods, and pay
statements. Id.
243. Id. (slip op., at 5) (“The agreement contained a ‘Class Action Waiver’
providing that in any arbitral proceeding, the parties could not bring any
dispute as a class, collective, or representative PAGA action.” (emphasis
added)).
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claim—specifically the claim that arose from the violation that
she personally suffered.244
The Court held that “the FAA preempts the Iskanian rule
insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual
and non-individual claims through an agreement to
arbitrate.”245 Further, a PAGA action asserting multiple
violations under California’s Labor Code affecting a range of
different employees does not constitute “a single claim” in even
the broadest possible sense.246 Because arbitration is a matter
of “consent, not coercion,” Moriana could not circumvent the
demands of individual arbitration through a PAGA claim.247
Viking River Cruises, however, does not resolve all of the
remaining issues in this complex and everchanging area of the
law. There are still live questions that must be answered.
III. MASS ARBITRATION 2.0
“The Court has, step by step, built a house of cards that has
almost no resemblance to the structure envisioned by the
original [FAA].”248 The effects of Mass Arbitration are uniform
across the consumer, employee, and antitrust landscapes
because the Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA
consistently regardless of the substance of the contractual
relationship in each case.249 Given the profound impacts of Mass
Arbitration, it is inevitable that businesses, the defense bar, and
interest groups will jump into action and try to circumvent its
affects.250 The key here is that this is a snapshot in time—the
244. Id. Relying on the Iskanian rule, the trial court denied the motion and
the California Court of Appeal affirmed. Id.
245. Id. (slip op., at 12).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Moses, supra note 27, at 113.
249. See generally, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S.
228 (2013) (antitrust dispute); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333 (2011) (consumer dispute); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018)
(employer-employee dispute); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,
559 U.S. 662 (2010) (dispute between two sophisticated business entities).
250. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 93) (arguing that for Mass
Arbitration to remain a viable means of dispute resolution, the “industry”
must adapt to defense bar attacks); Mass Arbitration is an Abuse of the
Arbitration System, U.S. CHAMBER, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (June 4, 2021),
https://perma.cc/HH6K-A5EZ (arguing that plaintiffs’ firms are abusing the
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defense bar’s response to Mass Arbitration is imminent, but the
nature of the response remains unclear.
Whichever way corporations respond, whether uniformly or
inconsistently, the tools that consumers and employees have at
their disposal, including Mass Arbitration in its current
incarnation, will change. This Note analyzes two potential
corporate responses to Mass Arbitration. First, there may be a
return to the traditional legal system for dispute resolution.251
Conversely, corporations can “tighten the screws” and eliminate
their own handpicked “consumer-friendly” provisions that made
Mass Arbitration a reality.252 Law firms have already provided
recommendations to their clients on how to avoid “the draconian
outcomes” of Mass Arbitration.253 These include amending
consumer agreements to require informal dispute resolution
before arbitration is commenced, requesting individualized
information in demands for arbitration, contractually
prohibiting Mass Arbitration, and eliminating provisions that
require the company to pay arbitration fees.254
The rush to fight against Mass Arbitration is grounded in
the assumption that it is only an attempt by greedy plaintiffs’
firms to extract exorbitant legal fees from clients with frivolous
claims.255 This assumption is based on the premise that

arbitration system to get large settlement payouts from “frivolous and
fraudulent” claims).
251. See infra Part III.A.
252. See infra Part III.B.
253. See, e.g., Cecilia Y. Oh & Perie Reiko Koyama, Retail Industry 2021
Year in Review: Retail Giant Drops Arbitration Clause—Is This the Right Move
for Your Agreement?, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 4, 2022), https://perma.cc/7LF9-F7CU
(recommending amending arbitration agreements to eliminate consumers’
ability to effectively leverage fee-shifting provisions).
254. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. MCCARTHY ET AL., GREENBERG TRAURIG,
ADVISORY: STEMMING THE TIDE OF MASS ARBITRATION 12–13 (June 2021),
https://perma.cc/6EF5-RAZZ (PDF) [hereinafter GREENBERG TRAURIG
ADVISORY ON MASS ARBITRATION].
255. See, e.g., id. at 12; Gibson Dunn Mass Arbitration Advisory, supra
note 163, at 1 (“[I]t is often difficult to identify and eliminate those frivolous
claims before the arbitrations commence, and many arbitration providers
insist on the company paying nonrefundable filing fees regardless of whether
the claims have merits.”); Frankel, Intuit Defends $40 Million Settlement,
supra note 191 (“Intuit suggested that Keller Lenkner’s true motivation is its
own $8 million stake in its mass arbitration claim against the company.”).
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small-dollar claims are inherently frivolous,256 but evidence does
not support this.257 Mass Arbitration demands are “claims by
some of the most economically vulnerable members of our
society, whom corporations have brazenly exploited, secure in
the knowledge that there was no real way for them to fight back
against unlawful treatment.”258 This faulty assumption took
hold and Mass Arbitration 2.0 will soon be a reality.
A.

Corporations Throw in the Towel and Return to
Conventional Civil Litigation

Arbitration agreements are presented in contracts of
adhesion, and, therefore, companies can singlehandedly alter
the forum in which potential claims are resolved.259 The odds
that a consumer or employee will reject any new terms are
incredibly low.260 Consequently, the defense bar has spent the
better part of the last forty years creating its own body of law to
shield its clients from civil liability,261 and some of its members
have already abandoned that carefully crafted legal system in
favor of the one they left behind. In June 2021, after receiving
75,000 demands for arbitration alleging that it illegally recorded
voices through the Echo Dot Kids devices, Amazon eliminated
its 350-word compulsory consumer arbitration agreement in

256. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 27) (differentiating
small-dollar and meritless claims by stating that “individually unmarketable
does not mean meritless; individually marketable does not mean
meritorious”).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, Amazon Faced 75,000 Arbitration Demands.
Now It Says: Fine, Sue Us, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2021, 7:30 AM),
https://perma.cc/9UF4-AWBZ; Opinion, What Happens When You Click
“Agree”?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2021), https://perma.cc/CH3E-6WXW (“At its
core, the arrangement is unbalanced, putting the burden on consumers to read
through voluminous, nonnegotiable documents, written to benefit corporations
in exchange for access to their services.”).
260. See Defendant’s Supplemental Brief at 14, Turner v. Chipotle
Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02612 (D. Colo. Apr. 16, 2018), ECF No. 182
[I]f you choose not to agree to the arbitration agreement, for example, once
you have been given notice and an opportunity to look at it, read it, ask any
questions, download it, save it, whatever you want to do—if you don’t, then
you don’t have to be an employee. (emphasis added).

261.

See Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 27, at 3082–83.
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favor of a two-sentence forum-selection and choice-of-law
provision.262 Amazon abandoned its long-held pressure
campaign to advance arbitration as a legitimate means of
alternative dispute resolution and said, “Fine, sue us.”263
Some businesses have eliminated pre-dispute arbitration
provisions only for claims involving sexual assault or
harassment in the workplace.264 While Congress recently
amended the FAA to prohibit the enforcement of agreements in
this context,265 the underlying rationale for removing the
provisions in the first place provides an instructive framework
for corporations eliminating arbitration provisions.266
Both Postmates267 and Intuit,268 along with other companies
facing Mass Arbitration, attempted to unilaterally return to the
class litigation system, negotiating and settling the claims.
After Intuit prevailed on its motion to compel arbitration, it
backtracked and found it to be more advantageous to negotiate
a settlement agreement.269 Postmates was able to get the
Supreme Court of the United States to grant certiorari—a rare
feat on its own—in its case challenging the applicability of the
California PAGA, but it appears that it will backtrack and elect

262. See
Conditions
of
Use,
AMAZON.COM
SERVS.
LLC,
https://perma.cc/7GGK-R72Q (last updated May 3, 2021) (“Any dispute or
claim relating in any way to your use of any Amazon Service will be
adjudicated in the state or Federal courts in King County, Washington, and
you consent to exclusive jurisdiction and venue in these courts. We each waive
any right to a jury trial.”); Randazzo, supra note 259 (“Amazon’s decision to
drop its arbitration requirement is the starkest example yet of how companies
are responding to plaintiffs’ lawyers pushing the arbitration system to its
limits.”).
263. Randazzo, supra note 259.
264. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration
for Sexual Misconduct Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/37SS-778E;
Daisuke
Wakabayashi
&
Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, Facebook to Drop Forced Arbitration in Harassment Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/XUQ6-83J5.
265. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26 (2022).
266. See infra Part IV.D.
267. Frankel, Postmates Resorts to Class Actions, supra note 238.
268. Frankel, Intuit Defends $40 Million Settlement, supra note 191.
269. See supra Part II.B.
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to settle millions of dollars’ worth of claims to avoid the threat
of Mass Arbitration.270
Allowing businesses to pick and choose when to permit class
settlements in lieu of enforcing arbitration agreements is an
inequitable sampling technique. This scenario is commonly
“heads I win, tails you lose,” with corporations either
conveniently compelling arbitration for “meritless” claims or
negotiating an agreement to settle meritorious ones.271 These
unilateral choices silence consumers, denying them a voice in
deciding how their grievances will be adjudicated. In response,
Keller Lenkner has forced businesses to adhere to the terms
they fought tooth and nail for.272 Businesses possess the
authority to decide which avenue to pursue—if they believe that
settling claims as a class is a more efficient way to resolve
disputes, then they should amend their agreements and permit
aggrieved consumers to bring class action lawsuits in the first
instance.
B.

“Tighten the Screws:” Eliminate “Saving Grace”
Consumer-Friendly Terms

Corporations, to ensure their compulsory arbitration
agreements will be enforced according to their terms, include
provisions that give the illusion that arbitration is a practical
forum for consumers and employees to adjudicate disputes.273
The continued use of these provisions requires a careful
cost-benefit analysis—weighing the benefits of class waivers
with the “costs” of a steady increase in Mass Arbitration. In a
270. See Motion to Extend Time to File Response at 1, Postmates, LLC v.
Rimler, No. 21-119 (Jan. 19, 2022); Grace Elletson, Workers Say $32M
Postmates Deal May Moot High Court Petition, LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2022, 2:02
PM), https://perma.cc/29DV-6QCD.
271. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 27–28).
272. See, e.g., Motion to Intervene and In Opposition to Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement at 9–10, In re Intuit Free File Litigation,
No. 3:19-cv-02546 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2020), ECF No. 177.
273. See Michael R. Booden, How to Avoid Mass Arbitration Claims, ACC
DOCKET (Apr. 20, 2022), https://perma.cc/2YST-NZCK (“In order to avoid
having courts (and in every state the standard may be different) declare
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts unenforceable because of one or more
of these contract defenses, class-action lawyers often recommend that
companies pay all administrative, arbitrator compensation and hearing fees.”);
see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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firm advisory, after concluding that the costs of arbitration far
outweigh the benefits, Greenberg Traurig recommended that
corporations consider amending their arbitration agreements to
curb the effects of Mass Arbitration.274 Ticketmaster, for
example, amended its terms of service to require a potential
claimant to “personally meet and confer” with Ticketmaster to
informally resolve the dispute.275 It is only after this “personal
meeting” that a claimant can submit a demand for arbitration
which delays or impedes the Mass Arbitration mechanism.276
The key for the defense bar is to effectively hinder Mass
Arbitration while also ensuring that courts will enforce these
amended agreements.277 This Note addresses this balance and
analyzes the elimination of consumer-friendly provisions under
the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. As discussed
above, it is these provisions that enabled Mass Arbitration in
the first place.278 Because the Court’s interpretation of the FAA
does not rest on the language of the Act or its legislative history,
it is unlikely that eliminating these provisions would invalidate
an arbitration agreement on unconscionability grounds.279 If
companies were to eliminate these provisions, the Court might
be forced to define the outer bounds of the effective vindication
doctrine.280

274. See GREENBERG TRAURIG ADVISORY ON MASS ARBITRATION, supra note
254, at 12–13 (“Although it is a prospective measure, perhaps the strongest
way a company can avoid or limit mass arbitration filings in the future is by
amending its arbitration agreement to address the claimants’ filing strategy
preemptively.”).
275. Terms of Use, TICKETMASTER, https://perma.cc/R6YD-6ZTF (last
updated July 2, 2021); see Booden, supra note 273 (recommending, among
other things, that companies require consumers to consent to mediation hosted
by their own mediators prior to commencing arbitration).
276. Medintz, supra note 177.
277. GREENBERG TRAURIG ADVISORY ON MASS ARBITRATION, supra note 254,
at 13 (“When amending the arbitration agreement, striking a balance between
what is needed to ameliorate the risk of mass claims and what is needed to
ensure that the contract will still be enforced by a court may go a long way.”).
278. See supra Part II.A.
279. See infra Part III.B.
280. See infra Part III.B.
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1.

Unconscionability?

It would be hard to overstate the importance of the modern
unconscionability doctrine to the defense bar’s calculus in
responding to Mass Arbitration. Relying on the FAA’s savings
clause, claimants seeking to bring classwide or representative
claims despite an arbitration agreement mandating individual
adjudication argued that the enforcement of the agreement
would be “unconscionable.”281 In most jurisdictions today,
modern unconscionability consists of two elements: procedural
and
substantive
unconscionability.282
Procedural
unconscionability concerns the circumstances of contract
formation, “such as whether a provision was offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis or buried in fine print.”283 Substantive
unconscionability focuses on whether specific contractual terms
are overtly one-sided or prejudicial to one party with unequal
bargaining power.284 Procedural unconscionability is especially
relevant to Mass Arbitration as mandatory bilateral arbitration
agreements are typically found in contracts of adhesion.285
Removing some clauses, however, could implicate substantive
unconscionability as well if the agreement becomes so
egregiously one-sided that it eliminates the ability to litigate a
dispute.
Eliminating consumer-friendly provisions would likely
push courts to reexamine the underlying rationales of the
holdings that led to the current arbitration landscape. In its
brief before the Court in Concepcion, AT&T heavily relied on the
consumer-friendly provisions in its consumer agreement to
advance the legitimacy of arbitration.286 AT&T went so far as to
281. See Horton, Unconscionability Wars, supra note 27, at 391–94.
282. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2012); Horton,
Unconscionability Wars, supra note 27, at 393.
283. Horton, Unconscionability Wars, supra note 27, at 393.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 392 (addressing how courts and scholars squared contracts
of adhesion with contract law and the Federal Arbitration Act); Stephen A.
Plass, Federalizing Contract Law, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 191, 194–96
(2020).
286. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893) (characterizing the features of the arbitration
agreement in a way that “encourage[s] consumers to pursue claims through
bilateral arbitration”).
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say that it made the arbitration process “easy to use”—a
consumer “need only fill out and mail a one-page Notice of
Dispute form” posted on AT&T’s website.287 Why would a
corporation wholeheartedly endorse an agreement that easily
subjects it to litigation? If bringing an arbitration claim was
simple, as to only require filling out and mailing a form on a
website, it is unrealistic to believe that AT&T would fight for the
agreements’ enforceability without some ulterior motive.
The answer is simple: these “friendly” provisions “existed to
facilitate the enforcement of the class-action waivers.”288 The
defense bar concluded that individual arbitration would not be
economically efficient and thus concern over the exercise of the
fee-shifting provisions was far less than the concern over the
enforceability of a class waiver.289 The “consumer-friendly”
provisions that make arbitration “easy to use” are little more
than vague aspirations—like dangling a treat in front of a dog
and never actually giving it to her.
The filing fees for arbitration are higher than court fees290
and often far exceed the value of the individual claim itself,291
eliminating the rational economic incentive to bring the
claim.292 Through Mass Arbitration, plaintiffs’ attorneys
resolved this economic inefficiency by fronting the initial filing
fee, anticipating reimbursement for the filing fees and
287. Id. at 7–8.
288. Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 37).
289. See id. (“The calculus by corporations here was as obvious as it was
rational. Even with the fee-shifting provisions in the arbitration agreements,
individual arbitration would not frequently be economically rational for an
ordinary claimant or her lawyer.”).
290. Compare AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 1–4 (2020),
https://perma.cc/9KQL-QYQG (PDF) (stating that individual consumer
arbitration filing fees are $200 and the arbitrator’s fees can be as much as
$2,500 per day), and AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT/WORKPLACE FEE SCHEDULE
1–4 (2020), https://perma.cc/BP4V-944C (PDF) (stating that individual filing
fees are $300, and the arbitrator’s fees are subject to change), with 26 U.S.C.
§ 1914(a) (providing that the filing fee for civil cases in district court is $350).
291. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 52)
For instance, to a couple earning $32,877 a year, the $200 they were owed
by Intuit (TurboTax) was a significant amount of money. But the portion of
the arbitration filing fee for which they were responsible, pursuant to their
arbitration agreement, was $200 making the claim economically irrational
for the plaintiffs (or their counsel) to pursue.

292.

Id.
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attorneys’ fees, as well as adequate compensation for their client
upon the claim’s successful resolution.293 Thus, one possible
response to Mass Arbitration is to remove this economic
incentive from the calculation and eliminate fee-shifting
provisions in the agreements.294
This analysis relies on two assumptions: first, that the
Supreme Court, when it has an opportunity to review the
enforceability of “bare bones” arbitration agreement, will adhere
to the principles of stare decisis; and second, that corporations
eliminate all consumer-friendly provisions.295 It is important to
be clear about what the holding in Concepcion was—the FAA
preempts any state law or rule that “condition[s] the
enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of
class-wide arbitration procedures.”296 The holding was grounded
in the principle that the FAA’s “liberal policy favoring
arbitration” outweighed a state’s legitimate interest in
alleviating the impact of consumer’s uneven bargaining
power.297
While Concepcion’s facts dealt with the corporate-consumer
relationship, its principal framework applies to the
employer-employee dynamic as well.298 The Supreme Court
recognizes that it has rejected every argument to come before it
that the FAA conflicts with other federal statutory provisions.299
Though the Court is misguided in this interpretation, the status
quo poses a significant barrier for employees to challenge class
representation waivers. For example, employees seeking
293. See id. (manuscript at 6) (noting that when Keller Lenkner filed
12,501 individual arbitration demands on Uber, it further demanded that
Uber reimburse $18.75 million in filing fees).
294. See Booden, supra note 273 (recommending that companies amend
arbitration agreements to require consumers to pay fees equal to those
charged in small claims court).
295. For purposes of this Note, a “bare bones” arbitration agreement is one
that contains provisions mandating individual bilateral arbitration and does
not include any fee-sharing provisions or financial incentives for claimants to
bring meritorious claims.
296. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
297. Id.
298. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
299. See id. at 1627 (noting that the Court has rejected the argument that
federal statutes, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Securities Act,
and RICO, conflict with the mandate of the FAA).
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guidance on the applicability of federal labor laws to their
employment arrangements regularly face unscalable obstacles
in the way of adequately enforcing their rights.300
Unconscionability has long been recognized as a legitimate
means to overcome these obstacles, and courts would be
hard-pressed to avoid an unconscionability ruling given the
immense unfairness of a “bare bones” arbitration agreement. 301
The defense bar, nevertheless, will continue to stack the deck in
its favor and argue that it is merely reinvigorating arbitration
in a way that ensures a fair and expeditious dispute resolution
process. Perhaps there is a straight-faced argument that
plaintiffs’ firms abused the “consumer-friendly” system
businesses created by initiating Mass Arbitration. Given the
current ideological split of the Supreme Court, the Court likely
would agree with the argument that eliminating such terms is
releveling the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants.302
Assuming drafters included these provisions to force the
Supreme Court’s hand, absent its current jurisprudence,
arbitration
agreements
with
class
waivers
are
unconscionable.303 Most pre-dispute arbitration agreements are
included in contracts of adhesion, requiring a party with little to
no bargaining power to accept the terms or forgo the business’s
services.304 Substantively, if the agreement is plainly one-sided,
such as by restricting access to discovery or mandating that the
claimant pay exorbitant filing fees, the agreement is per se
unconscionable and Section 2’s saving clause should kick in.305
For instance, DirecTV, a subsidiary of AT&T, provides that
it will pay all costs of arbitration for nonfrivolous claims of less
than $75,000, regardless of who wins, in its customer

300. See Booden, supra note 273 (clarifying that the FAA still mandates
enforcement of arbitration agreements for disputes involving wage disputes,
Title VII discrimination, and the Equal Pay Act).
301. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 19).
302. Id.
303. See Horton, Unconscionability Wars, supra note 27, at 393–94.
304. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347 (2011)
(explaining that the fact that a contract is adhesive is insufficient to invalidate
it); see also RADIN, supra note 75, at 41 (explaining how identical contracts of
adhesion proliferate through a particular industry, causing the contracts to
“occup[y] the territory in which a consumer is participating”).
305. See infra Part IV.A.
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agreement.306 This agreement makes Mass Arbitration a viable
means of adjudication—providing leverage to plaintiffs’ firms to
effectively resolve meritorious claims. An agreement lacking a
fee-shifting structure and incentives for meritorious claims
would be nothing more than a class waiver. This would require
individual claimants to arbitrate claims and waive their right to
their day in court. The Supreme Court will be forced to address
whether the FAA is a mechanism to circumvent liability, or if
the FAA’s savings clause has any force at all.
Current Justices have pushed for the Court to adopt a
broader interpretation of the FAA that would guarantee the
enforceability of nearly all arbitration agreements. For instance,
Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring in Concepcion, argued that
arbitration agreements subject to the FAA should be fully
enforced unless the opponent of the agreement can “successfully
challeng[e] the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as
by proving fraud or duress.”307 He reiterated this idea in Italian
Colors, stating that, because the high costs of litigation do not
implicate fraud or duress, the agreement was enforceable.308 By
that standard, essentially no arbitration agreement would be
unconscionable,309 as traditional consumer agreements are
presented as contracts of adhesion and by their nature do not
involve duress or fraud.310

306. See DirecTV Residential Customer Agreement, DIRECTV § 8 (Nov. 1,
2020), https://perma.cc/WEG8-CJAY.
307. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring). Notably, Justice
Thomas adheres to the view that the FAA does not apply in proceedings in
state court. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
285–96 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing at the time Congress passed
the FAA, “[i]t would have been extraordinary for Congress to attempt to
prescribe procedural rules for state courts”); see also Kindred Nursing Centers
L.P. v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246, 257 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Viking River
Cruises, Inc., v. Moriana, No. 21-119, 596 U.S. ___, ___ (2022). (slip op., at 1)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
308. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 570 U.S. 228, 239 (2013)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
309. See Horton, Unconscionability Wars, supra note 27, at 394 (noting
that because the Supreme Court has taken such a narrow view in interpreting
Section 2 of the FAA, traditional common law defenses appear to be
unpersuasive).
310. See J.W. Looney & Anita K. Poole, Adhesion Contracts, Bad Faith,
and Economically Faulty Contracts, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 177, 178–79 (1999).
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The Supreme Court seems unlikely to invalidate the
agreements
based
on
substantive
or
procedural
311
With a 6-3 conservative majority and a
unconscionability.
plethora of precedent to rely on, it would be easy for the Court
to invoke stare decisis and find that these agreements are
consistent with and fulfill the spirit of the FAA. After all,
conservative Courts have had no issue looking past the text of
the FAA previously and there is no reason to believe
unconscionability would prevail the next time it comes before
the Supreme Court. If class arbitration, and by analogy Mass
Arbitration, sacrifices informality—the so-called principal
advantage of arbitration—the Court in its current form would
likely be highly receptive to agreements that reinstate the
informality of the process. But once again, the “benefits” of
arbitration cannot be realized if arbitration cannot commence.
2.

Effective Vindication Doctrine?

The effective vindication doctrine should be an adequate
mechanism for courts to invalidate one-sided arbitration
agreements. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s current
incarnation of the doctrine undercuts its force. The Court, in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,312
created the effective vindication doctrine—a principle that may
provide some much-needed legal reprieve for plaintiffs in the
Court’s jurisprudence.313 There, the Court decided whether an
arbitration agreement was enforceable in a lawsuit that alleged
antitrust violations in an international commercial
transaction.314 The Court held that an agreement to arbitrate a
federal statutory claim would be valid “so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in

311. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 19).
312. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
313. Id. at 637 (stating that there is no reason not to enforce an arbitration
agreement so long as the “prospective litigant may vindicate its statutory
cause of action”).
314. Id. at 628. The Second Circuit had previously held that the arbitration
was unenforceable because the “pervasive public interest in enforcement of the
antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims that arise in such cases, combine
to make . . . antitrust claims . . . inappropriate for arbitration.” Id.
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the arbitral forum.”315 This substantially raised the plaintiff’s
burden, requiring them to show that the arbitration agreement
amounted to a prospective waiver of their right to pursue
statutory remedies.316 Applying this standard, the Court found
that the adjudication of an antitrust claim in arbitration does
not require a plaintiff to forfeit any statutorily guaranteed
rights or remedies.317 The Court, albeit in a footnote, placed a
small yet important limitation on its unwillingness to strike
down the agreement in this case: if an agreement contained
other prohibitive clauses, such as a choice-of-law provision or a
forum-selection clause, the Court would “have little hesitation
in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”318 While
this case principally dealt with international commercial
arbitration, it provided a foundation for the effective vindication
doctrine in consumer and employer arbitration.319
While certain federal statues provide sufficient policy
grounds that should invoke the doctrine, the categories of
applicable policy concerns remain undefined. As confusion grew
in the lower courts about the function of Mitsubishi Motors’s
holding, the Supreme Court provided much-needed guidance on
its application. In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph,320 the plaintiff filed a class action against Green Tree

315. Id. at 637 (finding that, as long as the arbitral forum provides a
sufficient manner for a litigant to effectively vindicate a statutory cause of
action, “the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function”). Current Justices do not unanimously view this as the central
holding of Mitsubishi Motors. Compare Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest.,
570 U.S. 228, 235 n.2 (2013) (arguing that the Mitsubishi Motors Court
withheld a determination on whether “the arbitration agreement’s potential
deprivation of a claimant’s right to pursue federal remedies may render that
agreement unenforceable”), with id. at 246–47 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that what the Mitsubishi Motors Court did not rule on was whether
the agreement in fact eliminated the claimant’s federal rights).
316. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 640; see Okezie Chukwumerije, The
Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration
Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 377–78 (2014).
317. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 640.
318. Id. at 637, n.19.
319. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228
(2013).
320. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
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Financial under the Truth in Lending Act321 and the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act.322 Despite previously agreeing to
submit disputes to arbitration, the plaintiff argued that because
of the cost-prohibitive nature of arbitration and the lack of
cost-shifting provisions in the agreement, she could not
effectively vindicate her rights in the arbitral forum.323 The
Court explained that although claims “arising under a statute
designed to further important social policies” could be forced
into arbitration, there are circumstances that would amount to
a waiver of the statutory rights.324
Holding that the plaintiff must arbitrate her claims, the
Court articulated a two-part test to determine whether an
arbitration agreement effectively prohibits a plaintiff’s ability to
pursue statutory rights.325 A court must first determine whether
the parties agreed to submit their claims to arbitration and
assess whether Congress evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.326 It
is then the plaintiff’s burden to establish the prohibitively high
costs.327 Applying this test, the Court found that the plaintiff did
not adequately prove that they would incur the alleged costs,
and for that reason, enforced the agreement.328
Although the effective vindication doctrine did not
invalidate the agreements in Mitsubishi Motors or Randolph,
the Court indicated that it would strike down an arbitration
clause that amounted to a prospective elimination of a
claimant’s ability to bring a claim.329 The Court later had
321. Pub L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f).
322. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691(f)).
323. See Randolph, 531 U.S. at 80–81.
324. See id. at 89 (explaining that claims involving important social
policies may be arbitrated because “so long as the prospective litigant may
effectively vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,
the statute serves its functions” (internal quotation omitted)).
325. Id. at 90.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 81.
328. See id. at 84.
329. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (“[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law
clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
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opportunities to “strike down” an arbitration agreement that fell
in this reservation, but declined to do so.330 As discussed above,
in her dissent in Italian Colors, Justice Elena Kagan fiercely
attacked the majority’s construction of Mitsubishi Motors,
arguing that the facts in the case constituted a clear instance in
which the Court should invalidate the agreement.331 Because
Congress intended to promote “the public interest in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws,”332 evidenced by its
enactment of a private cause of action in the federal antitrust
laws, an agreement should be invalid when the costs of
arbitration are prohibitively high.333
While applicable to other contexts, the effective vindication
doctrine is vital to privately enforce the antitrust laws.334
Without a rule that prohibits exculpatory clauses that prohibit
federal causes of action, Justice Kagan argued, “a company
could use its monopoly power to protect its monopoly power, by
coercing agreement to contractual terms eliminating its
antitrust liability.”335 American Express took advantage of this
blatant loophole and effectively shielded itself from liability.
Plaintiffs have yet to convince the Court that any contract
provision implicates the effective vindication doctrine. Prior to
2013, a plaintiff’s inability to effectively vindicate a statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum appeared to be a cognizable
defense against the enforcement of a mandatory individual
arbitration agreement.336 If corporations were to eliminate the
cost-sharing provisions currently found in many arbitration
agreements, the effective vindication doctrine, as articulated in
Mitsubishi Motors and constrained in Italian Colors, would be

statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in
condemning the agreement as against public policy.”).
330. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,
236 (2013).
331. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
332. Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955).
333. See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 243.
334. Id. at 241 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
335. Id. (“The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a
contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.”).
336. See Schwab, supra note 114, at 250–51 (explaining the conundrum
that courts faced in applying the effective vindication doctrine before the
Supreme Court’s holding in Italian Colors).
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an unlikely vehicle to strike down an agreement.337 Corporate
responses to combat Mass Arbitration are of a different
magnitude than the circumstances that plaintiffs last argued
the effective vindication doctrine before the Supreme Court.338
For example, the “bare bones” arbitration agreement here is
much less consumer-friendly from the ones at issue in Italian
Colors and Concepcion.339 Arguably, the doctrine may actually
do some work here, but it seems to be limited to instances
“where an arbitration agreement precludes the assertion of
certain statutory rights and cases where filing and
administrative fees in arbitration ‘are so high as to make access
to the forum impracticable.’”340
Despite arguments that Italian Colors went too far in its
destruction of the doctrine,341 a straightforward application of
its holding leads to the conclusion that the elimination of
cost-allocation provisions could eliminate a plaintiff’s right to
pursue a claim if it amounted to an all but absolute forfeiture of
a statutorily guaranteed right.342 The current doctrine will not
help, even under egregious circumstances. While the
prohibitively high costs of individual arbitration may be
insufficient to invalidate a bare-bones arbitration agreement,343
if a corporation limits the specific remedies available or restricts
where and when an arbitration demand may be brought, the
Court may be forced to reexamine its strict application of the
effective vindication doctrine.
For instance, consider an arbitration agreement that would
require the claimant to pay all upfront fees for an arbitration
that could only take place in-person in the city where the
business is headquartered and prohibits any form of injunctive
337. See id. at 250 (arguing that the Supreme Court created a double
standard in applying the effective vindication doctrine).
338. See supra Part I.C.3.
339. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2010);
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 235–36.
340. Chukwumerije, supra note 316, at 377–78.
341. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 12).
342. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235–36
(2013).
343. See id. at 236 (stating that filing and administrative fees “attached to
arbitration” would need to be “so high as to make access to the forum
impracticable”). The Court has never found arbitration to meet this “so high”
standard. See supra Part I.C.3.
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relief or nominal damages. While the agreement does not
explicitly require a consumer to waive their rights under, let’s
say, the Sherman Act, the restrictive provisions would
effectively foreclose a party’s right to pursue a claim.344 Because
the Supreme Court has set such a high bar for plaintiffs to
invoke the effective vindication doctrine, in its current form, the
doctrine does not adequately protect consumer and employee
rights. As Justice Kagan summarizes the majority opinion in
Italian Colors: “Too darn bad.”345
IV. WHAT NOW? HOW PLAINTIFFS WILL NO LONGER HEAR
“TOO DARN BAD”
As the Concepcions suggested to the Supreme Court,
corporate-minded interests have engaged in a “parade of
horribles,” nearly eliminating the ability of a consumer or
employee to hold businesses accountable.346 Mass Arbitration in
its current form allows plaintiffs to come up for air. While the
system will inevitably adapt to restrict the ability for consumers
and employers to adjudicate disputes,347 the right to have a day
in court is as fundamental as any right, and concrete steps must
be taken to ensure it is preserved.
A.

Overrule Concepcion and Limit the Preemptive Effect of
the FAA

The Supreme Court, apparently relying on the text of the
FAA, has consistently held that the Act preempts state
statutory and common law that “frustrate[s] its purpose.”348
This reliance appears to be unfounded because the statutory
language in no way supports the implication that Congress
intended the FAA to be substantive federal law. As Justice
Breyer argues in his dissenting opinion in Concepcion, federal
arbitration law normally leaves matters of contract defenses,

344. See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 235–36 (explaining that a provision
that forbid the assertion of certain statutory rights would be unenforceable
under the doctrine).
345. Id. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
346. See Brief for Respondent at 32, Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333.
347. See supra Part III.
348. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347 n.6 .
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such as duress and unconscionability, to the states.349 Contract
law has, after all, forever been a matter of state statutory and
common law.350
California masterfully crafted the Discover Bank rule and
applied the “same legal principles to address the
unconscionability of class arbitration as it does to address the
unconscionability of any other contractual provision . . . .”351
Section 2 of the FAA specifically permits this, as it allows for
invalidation only upon grounds that permit “revocation of any
contract,” placing arbitration agreements on equal footing with
all other contracts.352 But through misguided statutory
interpretation, the Supreme Court ignored Congress’s intent
and forced its own policy preferences to find in favor of corporate
interests.353 The California courts established the rule, and as
Justice Breyer argued, “Why is this kind of decision . . . not
California’s to make?”354 The Supreme Court should allow states
to reclaim what is rightfully theirs. It is time to eliminate the
preemptive effect of the FAA.
B.

Reinvigorate the Effective Vindication Doctrine

In its current form, the effective vindication doctrine is little
more than a mirage—an empty promise from the Supreme
Court to invalidate an agreement that crosses the illogical line
it drew. If the effective vindication doctrine is to “prevent
arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff’s ability to
enforce congressionally created rights,”355 its standard must
provide a role for courts to assess whether the agreement, in
fact, is engineered to thwart any meaningful ability to bring a
claim, not whether the agreement explicitly prohibits a
statutory claim. Randolph provides a subjective standard,
349. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 364–65 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S.
63, 68 (2010)); id. at 362 (arguing that the majority is unable to trace its
holding “to the history of the arbitration statute itself”).
350. See Glover, supra note 122 (manuscript at 19).
351. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 365.
352. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
353. See supra Part I.C.
354. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 366 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
355. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 240 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
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allowing plaintiffs to avoid arbitration if they can concretely
establish that the costs of arbitration would be so prohibitively
high that they would effectively be foreclosed from bringing the
claim.
Justice Kagan refined this in her Italian Colors dissent.356
The “prohibitively high cost” qualifier in Mitsubishi Motors and
Randolph must not be read only to relate to the costs of access
to the arbitral forum.357 Under this framework, the mechanism
that forecloses the effective vindication of a federal right is
irrelevant to the analysis. Therefore, the agreement must be
read in its entirety—and if the agreement read as a whole
precludes the ability of a plaintiff to enforce a federal statutory
right, right now, then the effective vindication doctrine would
forbid its enforcement.358 While a class action waiver is evidence
of the elimination of a right to pursue a statutory cause of action,
its presence does not preclude the applicability of the effective
vindication doctrine.359 For example, if the arbitration
agreement in Italian Colors contained the class waiver, but
provided that American Express would reimburse the expert
fees if the claimant prevailed, the doctrine likely would not
apply.360 Nevertheless, the goal of the doctrine is not to strike
down every arbitration agreement, rather it is to promote
arbitration in feasible situations and forbid it when agreements
are drafted in a predatory way.
Mass Arbitration may soon be a thing of the past, but, if
reinvigorated, the doctrine could prevent the enforcement of an
agreement that forecloses the ability for a claimant to vindicate
their rights. Consequently, without the doctrine, companies
have little incentive to draft provisions that facilitate
arbitration, running afoul of the intent of the FAA. It is past
time for courts to provide new life to this ever-important
doctrine.

356. See id. at 240–253.
357. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 65–66, Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 228,
2012 WL 6755152, at *40.
358. See supra Part III.B.2.
359. Justice Kagan goes to great lengths in her Italian Colors dissent to
emphasize that the temporal inquiry is right now, not in the “ye olde glory
days.” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 251 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
360. See id. at 246 n.2.
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States Enact Representative Claim Statutes

Given the general success of representative claim statutes,
states should swiftly enact them and arm their citizens with a
legal mechanism to hold employers accountable for flagrant
violations of state labor laws. The California PAGA provides a
concrete framework for states to use to protect employee rights
and effectively enforce state labor laws.361 Following in
California’s footsteps, New York legislators introduced the
Empowering People in Rights Enforcement (“EMPIRE”) Worker
Protection Act,362 which would enable an aggrieved employee,
whistleblower, or representative organization to bring a labor
code enforcement action on behalf of the State.363
The Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises
weighed the broad interpretation of the FAA against states’
interests in choosing how best to best enforce their labor
provisions. Concepcion and its progeny do not mandate the
enforcement of arbitration agreements that would strip the
state of its police power.364 The Court made clear that the FAA
does not require states to enforce agreements that effectively
waive statutory rights. Other states should follow suit and
combat the effects of the Supreme Court’s misguided
interpretation of the FAA.365
D.

The Easiest Solution: Congressional Action

Congressional action in the arbitration arena has long been
a dream that has not come to fruition. In February 2022,
however, Congress passed the Ending Forced Arbitration of

361. See supra Part II.C.
362. S.B. 12, 2021–2022 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2022).
363. Id.
364. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 19, Viking River Cruises, Inc.,
v. Moriana, No. 20-1573, 596 U.S. ___ (Sept. 10, 2021) (arguing the state’s
interest in its police power far outweighs the interest in enforcing a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement).
365. To protect citizens while also decreasing the risk of preemption, some
states have adopted laws that complement the FAA. See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 15/1– 14 (2022) (establishing separate rules for arbitration relating to
healthcare); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-407uu (2022) (providing that an
arbitration panel may award punitive damages against an employer if the
employer violates the state’s arbitration laws).
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Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021.366 The Act
prohibits the enforcement of employer agreements that
mandate arbitration for sexual assault and harassment
claims.367 In both the 116th and 117th Congresses, Democratic
members introduced the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act
of 2022 (“FAIR Act”),368 which would amend the FAA to prohibit
pre-dispute arbitration agreements that “force arbitration of
future employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights
disputes.”369 The United States House of Representatives passed
the FAIR Act in March 2022, but the Act is currently stalled in
the Senate Judiciary Committee.370 Its fate is all but doomed
given the equally-divided Senate and the 60-vote filibuster
threshold.371 Congress should pass this bill to end once and for
all this dark era of consumer and employee rights.372
Wholesale revision or Congressional reworking of the FAA
may be ideal, but for forty years Congress has stood by while the
Supreme Court developed its current framework. It is nice to
hold on to the dream, but advocates must be comprehensive in
addressing the issues at hand—whether in the short or long
term. They cannot simply hope that Congress will do something,
because history is clearly not on their side.
CONCLUSION
Mass Arbitration threw a curveball to the defense bar’s
attempt to eliminate civil liability. Creative law firms, however,

366. Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26 (2022). See generally David Horton,
The Limits of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Act, 132 YALE L.J. F. 1 (2022).
367. See Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26 (2022).
368. H.R. 963, 117th Cong. (2021).
369. Id. § 2 (2021). One study found that if even 20 percent of employers
complied with the FAIR Act, $1.8 billion would be put back in workers’ pockets
annually. BARAN & CAMPBELL, supra note 154, at 2.
370. H.R. 963, 117th Cong. (2021). Interestingly, Representative Matt
Gaetz was the only House Republican to vote for the passage of the bill. Id.
371. At the time of the writing of this Note, the Senate companion bill to
H.R. 963 currently has no Republican cosponsors in the United States Senate.
See S.505, 117th Cong. (2021).
372. Levi Sumagaysay, FAIR Act Is Being Revived in Washington, Raising
Hopes for the End to Forced Arbitration, MARKET WATCH (Feb. 11, 2021, 10:44
AM), https://perma.cc/4RTH-CVEV.
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forced corporations’ hands by compelling individual arbitration,
and, while the immediate effects have been profound, it is only
a matter of time before businesses amend their arbitration
agreements to circumvent Mass Arbitration. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence promises nothing
more than a grim future for consumer and employee rights. If
corporations eliminate the “saving grace” provisions from their
agreements which make Mass Arbitration feasible, plaintiffs
likely will not have an adequate path to their invalidation under
the Court’s current interpretation of the FAA.
The purpose of the FAA is to facilitate arbitration, not to
insulate parties from liability. While congressional action to
correct the consequences of the Court’s misinterpretation would
be ideal, heightened partisanship and strong corporate
opposition make it an infeasible solution. Given that reality,
courts must shift their focus away from the “fundamental
freedom to contract” to the ultimate purpose of the U.S. civil
litigation system. For too long, corporate interests have
prevailed in the Supreme Court. Consequently, egregiously
one-sided arbitration agreements have been successfully
enforced.373 This does not facilitate arbitration—it eliminates it.
Reinvigorating the effective vindication doctrine would resolve
this discrepancy. Courts would only enforce an arbitration
agreement, in conformance with the demands of the FAA, when
it is crafted to facilitate arbitration. But if the agreement
removes plaintiffs’ ability to realistically use the arbitral forum,
looking at the realistic consequences of enforcing the agreement
will adequately protect consumer and employee rights.374
Regrettably, relying on the Supreme Court to fix the issue
it created has proven impracticable.375 Therefore states must
enact representative claim statutes, such as the California
PAGA, to arm their citizens with adequate legal tools to combat
corporate defense tactics.376 It is time to close this nightmarish
period for consumer and employee rights and allow parties to
effectively resolve their disputes. Aggrieved plaintiffs will no
longer hear “too darn bad.”

373.
374.
375.
376.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part IV.C.

